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NOTE
DONATING DEBT TO SOCIETY:
PROSECUTORIAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS OF




Stephen Fagan's stated reason for kidnapping his daughters from
his ex-wife, Barbara Kurth, in 1979' was that Kurth suffered from
alcoholism and was "unable to care for" the children.2 Fagan brought
the girls down to Florida and lied to them that their mother had died
in a car accident.' He created a new life for himself and his daughters
in Florida by furnishing them with new names and identities.4 There,
he married a wealthy woman and the family lived in luxury.5 Kurth
devoted two years of her life to searching for her daughters to no
avail.6 Twenty years after the abduction, Fagan pleaded guilty to
kidnapping in exchange for a suspended jail sentence, five years of
probation, 2000 hours of community service, and a $100,000 charitable
contribution.7 Without the plea agreement, he could have faced up to
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. Special thanks to my
adviser and mentor, Professor Bruce Green, for his invaluable insight and assistance
on this Note. I also would like to thank Jeremy, Rick, and Candy Shweder for
challenging my arguments, and Sol and Vicky Shaz for their support.
1. Ellen O'Brien, A Plea, and a Family Saga Concludes: Fagan Pleads Guilty to
Kidnapping; Prison Sentence is Suspended, Boston Globe, May 29, 1999, at Al. The
couple had been divorced for about a year when Fagan kidnapped his children.
Joanna Coles, The Mother Whose Children Were Stolen, Times (London), July 21,
1999, § 3 (Features), at 39.
2. Ellen O'Brien, Fagan Lawyer Calls the Media Unfair, Boston Globe, May 30,
1999, at B3. His ex-wife, Barbara Kurth, denied Fagan's assertions and said that she
suffered from narcolepsy. Id.; see also Jack Sullivan, Ex-Wife Signs off on Fagan No-
Jail Plea Deal, Boston Herald, May 28, 1999, at 1.
3. Fagan Pays $100,000 as Part of Plea Deal, Boston Globe, July 24, 1999, at B4.
4. See O'Brien, supra note 2, at B3.
5. Jules Crittenden, Fagan Lawyer Cries Media Treated his Client Badly, Boston
Herald, May 30, 1999, at 20.
6. See O'Brien, supra note 2, at B3.
7. John Laidler, DA Coakley: The First Eight Months, Boston Globe, Aug. 29,
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twenty years in prison.8 He and his daughters proudly told their story
on several television programs,9 where Fagan boasted that, in
retrospect, he would abduct his children all over again.'0
The plea agreement disturbed Kurth." She said that the prosecutor
deceived her by allowing Fagan to avoid jail.12 Further, Kurth was
frustrated by the media attention surrounding the plea agreement
because it turned "'Fagan into some kind of hero,"' while the situation
had been devastating for her. 3 Several journalists agreed and
condemned the agreement as a way for the wealthy to avoid jail time 4
and as an inappropriate "wrist-slap sentence" that encourages others
to similarly break the law. 5 The district attorney, however, defended
the plea agreement as the best arrangement in this situation 6 because
Fagan's daughters wanted to testify that they were grateful that their
father had taken them from their mother, 7 thus prompting a fear of
jury nullification. 8
Allowing charitable contributions to be a part of plea agreements is
not unique to Fagan's case. Although this type of alternative sentence
is unusual, some courts have permitted contributions to be part of
plea agreements.19 Legal opinions state that sentences that include
charitable contributions allow defendants in certain situations to be
rehabilitated more successfully than they do with traditional
sentences, because the contributions allow defendants to confront the
harm that they have done.2" Additionally, for certain defendants
1999, City Weekly, at 1. Kurth chose the charitable organization that received the
money. See Fagan Pays $100,000 as Part of Plea Deal, supra note 3, at B4.
8. Pamela Ferdinand, Father Pleads Guilty to Girls' '79 Abduction: Prison Term
Avoided; Daughters Support Him, Wash. Post, May 29, 1999, at A2.
9. Margery Eagan, Mom Says DA Forced Her to Accept Kidnapper Fagan's Deal,
Boston Herald, June 1, 1999, at 1.
10. Coles, supra note 1, at 39.
11. See Eagan, supra note 9, at 1.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Editorial, Getting Away with Crime, Boston Herald, June 2, 1999, at
32.
15. Editorial, Kidnap Probation Sentence Galling, Sun-Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale,
Fla.), June 2, 1999, at 2A; see also Joan Vennochi, Op-Ed, An Unrepentant Fagan
Thumbs His Nose at us All, Boston Globe, June 4, 1999, at A23.
16. See Sally Jacobs, Martha Coakley's Permanent Campaign, Boston Globe, Nov.
28,1999, Magazine, at 12.
17. See Laidler, supra note 7, at 1; O'Brien, supra note 1, at Al.
18. Jury nullification is when a jury determines that a defendant is not guilty even
though the prosecutor has proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt because the
jurors believe the law is "immoral or unwise" or that the defendant has been
"'punished enough' already." Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 1.02, at
5 (3d ed. 2001). Jury nullification is lauded as a "'conscience of the community,"' but
it is criticized because jurors violate their oath and may perpetuate criminal behavior
by refusing to punish offenders. Id. at 6 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
519 & n.15 (1968)).
19. See infra notes 167-86, 201-26 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 167-81 and accompanying text.
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these sentences appear to provide greater deterrence than traditional
sentences because they generate more publicity than traditional
sentences and serve as a continual reminder to the defendant of the
wrongdoing.21 Yet, the potential for abuse or the appearance of abuse
in a system that allows charitable contributions to be part of plea
agreements may render these arrangements unethical.22 For example,
if a victim, like Fagan's ex-wife, feels that a prosecutor or judge
allowed a defendant to escape punishment by "buying" his way out of
jail, then allowing the charitable contribution to be a part of the
sentence could be unethical.
Courts and bar committees that have addressed this issue differ as
to whether prosecutors and judges ethically can allow charitable
contributions as a part of plea agreements.23 Although certain factors
tend to make commentators view the practice as ethical24 or
unethical,25 this overall lack of consensus complicates whether
prosecutors and judges should permit these types of plea agreements.
The ethical rules themselves are similarly unclear.26 A few courts and
bar committees permit the contributions because ethical rules do not
specifically prohibit the sentences, particularly for prosecutors.27
This Note addresses whether permitting charitable contributions in
plea agreements is an ethical practice for prosecutors who enter into
these types of agreements with defendants and for judges who accept
the agreements. Part I describes a prosecutor's role in plea bargaining
and the ethical issues that arise from engaging in plea bargaining.
This part details the ethical rules that are implicated by including
charitable contributions in plea agreements. Then, this part examines
the judicial ethics involved in sentencing and the ethical canons that
may be invoked when judges permit charitable contributions in
sentences.
Part II analyzes how courts and bar committees have addressed
using charitable contributions as part of plea agreements and
sentences in light of judges' and prosecutors' roles in handling
21. See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Parts II.A.1 and II.B.1 for a discussion of the ethical rules that judges
and prosecutors must consider when including conditions of charitable contributions
in plea agreements and sentences, including prejudicing the administration of justice,
creating a conflict of interest, and avoiding the appearance of impropriety.
23. See infra Part It.
24. For example, charitable contributions are generally permitted in sentences
and plea agreements when the contributions would help to rehabilitate the defendant.
See infra notes 167-74, 213-14 and accompanying text.
25. For example, charitable contributions are generally not permitted in sentences
and plea agreements when the judge or prosecutor has an interest in the charitable
organization receiving the contribution. See infra notes 146-49, 194-96 and
accompanying text.
26. See infra Parts I.B-C.
27. See infra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
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criminal cases.28 Few courts and bar committees have addressed this
issue for prosecutors. 9 Those that have addressed this issue generally
consider the practice ethical unless the prosecutor had a connection to
the charitable organization to which the defendant was giving a
contribution." Conversely, courts and bar committees who have
addressed this issue for judges generally have not considered it ethical
for judges to approve of charitable contributions in sentences because
doing so fosters the appearance of impropriety.31
Part III proposes that the justice system could allow charitable
contributions in an ethical manner as part of plea bargains in certain
criminal cases by recommending that a uniform system be created to
help determine the appropriateness of this alternative sentence. This
part recommends a system that permits charitable contributions in
plea agreements and sentences only if prosecutors and judges consider
the defendant's offense and financial situation, the degree to which
contributions can be incorporated into sentences, and the charities
that are appropriate for this purpose. Part III concludes by applying
this system to hypothetical situations that reflect the issues presented
in Part II.
I. PROSECUTORS' AND JUDGES' ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN PLEA
BARGAINING
Plea bargaining is a device that prosecutors use to aid in settling
cases without a trial.32 Traditionally, plea agreements have included
jail time, fines, or probation in exchange for guilty pleas.33 Allowing
defendants to give charitable contributions legally can be part of the
punishment as well. Using charitable contributions in this way,
however, may raise ethical concerns for prosecutors and judges. The
various codes of ethics do not address these ethical concerns
specifically,34 but the more general rules governing prosecutors' and
judges' conduct can guide prosecutors and judges in evaluating
charitable contributions. Part L.A discusses the benefits and
drawbacks of plea bargaining and the function of prosecutors in the
process. Part I.B focuses on the ethical rules that are associated with
28. There is little case law and academic material on this precise topic. Therefore,
this Note relies heavily on the available state and federal cases, bar committees'
advisory opinions, and news articles to analyze the current viewpoints on this topic
and to draw conclusions.
29. For examples of courts and bar committees that have addressed this issue, see
infra notes 194-96 and 201-03 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 194-96, 201-03 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
32. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 1.3(o), at 124-25 (2d ed.
1999).
33. 5 id. § 21.1(h), at 24,26.
34. See infra Parts I.B-C.
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plea bargaining. Part I.C addresses the ethical rules that bind judges
when they accept plea agreements and sentence defendants.
A. Prosecutors' Role in Plea Bargaining
Prosecutors have long used plea bargaining35 to resolve cases while
avoiding trial.36 Plea bargaining is justified as a way to conserve
resources37 and to reduce prosecutors' tremendous caseload burden 3
because the trial process can be lengthy.39 Defendants may be
persuaded to plead guilty to a less serious offense to avoid higher
penalties or social stigma.4" Further, plea bargaining reduces the time
between an offense and punishment, allowing defendants who are
incarcerated pending trial to be released more quickly. 1  This
decrease in time also assists victims to move forward once justice has
been served. Moreover, defendants may feel a more immediate
connection between the crime committed and the punishment
associated with it, which may combat recidivism.42 Finally, plea
bargaining can ensure that a defendant is punished, which he
otherwise might avoid because of jury nullification or because a victim
or other witness refuses to testify.
4 3
Despite these potential benefits, plea agreements can be unfair.44 A
defendant who accepts a plea agreement bargains for a prosecutor to
recommend a lighter punishment than for a defendant who exercises
his constitutional right to trial.45 A prosecutor makes this concession
to resolve the case without the burden of a trial.46 Further, the plea
35. Plea bargaining is a "[n]egotiated agreement between a prosecutor and a
criminal defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense or to one
of multiple charges in exchange for some concession by the prosecutor, usu[ally] a
more lenient sentence or a dismissal of the other charges." Black's Law Dictionary
1173 (7th ed. 1999).
36. Plea bargaining has been part of the judicial system for at least 150 years. 5
LaFave et al., supra note 32, § 21.1(b), at 7. Most criminal cases are resolved by plea
agreements. 5 id. § 21.1(a), at 4; see also John Jay Douglass, Ethical Issues in
Prosecution 262 (1988) (noting that 90% of felony convictions are the product of plea
agreements).
37. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (upholding the
constitutionality of plea bargaining).
38. See 5 LaFave et al., supra note 32, § 21.1(c), at 8-9; see also 1 id. § 1.2(b), at 37.
39. See 1 id. § 1.3(q), at 133.
40. See 5 id. § 21.1(a), at 5.
41. Brady, 397 U.S. at 752; see also Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining,
75 Tul. L. Rev. 695, 704 (2001).
42. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 753 (noting that a defendant who is willing to admit his
crime may rehabilitate more quickly); see also Colquitt, supra note 41, at 704-05.
43. For example, in the Fagan case, where the father said that he is trying to help
his children and his children will testify likewise, it is possible that the prosecutor did
not believe that a jury would convict the defendant even though he had admitted to
the abduction. See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 45-48.
45. See supra note 35.
46. See Colquitt, supra note 41, at 704, 706.
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bargaining process is not uniform. Defendants who are able to afford
attorneys that have significant time to spend on their cases may have
more control over the process than others.47 In addition, when a plea
bargain is struck, prosecutors replace juries in determining a
defendant's guilt,4" which may be unfair because the jury system is
grounded on the concept that a collection of the defendant's fellow
citizens will assess the defendant's guilt. Finally, innocent defendants
might accept punishment to avoid the risk of a trial and the potential
of a longer sentence49 that may be mandated by the federal sentencing
guidelines if they are found guilty.
Prosecutors have considerable discretion in charging and trying
crimes5° because they must balance effective law enforcement and the
rights of the accused.51 Some scholars have asserted that prosecutors
are the "most powerful lawyers"5 because they represent the
government as well as citizens within their jurisdiction.53 Hence,
47. Id. at 706.
48. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham
L. Rev. 2117, 2120 (1998).
49. See 5 LaFave et al., supra note 32, § 21.1(d), at 11.
50. See Douglass, supra note 36, at 220 (explaining that a "prosecutor's authority
to charge is a highly discretionary power as to whom to charge, when to charge, what
charges to bring and whether to dismiss charges").
51. See 4 LaFave et al., supra note 32, § 13.2(a), at 10-11 (citing Pugach v. Klein,
193 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)). Recently, Attorney General John Ashcroft
issued a policy directive highlighting that the federal sentencing guidelines direct
federal prosecutors to "[p]ursue the [m]ost [s]erious, [r]eadily [p]rovable [o]ffense in
[a]ll [flederal [p]rosecutions." John Ashcroft, Memorandum, Department Policy
Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing, at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/ashcroft92203chrgmem.pdf (Sept. 22, 2003).
The directive deters plea bargaining by limiting prosecutorial discretion. See Mark
Hamblett, Ashcroft Memo Discourages Plea Bargains, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 23, 2003, at 1;
Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft Limiting Prosecutors' Use of Plea Bargains, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 23, 2003, at Al. Plea bargaining often includes an agreement that the defendant
will be charged with a less serious offense if he pleads guilty and avoids a trial. See 5
LaFave et al., supra note 32, § 21.1(a), at 5.
52. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice?, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J.
607, 626 (1999) (discussing the history of prosecutors' unique responsibilities).
53. See Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-13(1) (2004). Ethical
Consideration 7-13(1) explains that prosecutors have a special duty because "the
prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore should use restraint in the
discretionary exercise of governmental powers, such as in the selection of cases to
prosecute." Id. Three states use a version of the Model Code: New York, Ohio, and
Oregon. See A.B.A. Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards
561 (2003 ed.). The New York Code of Professional Responsibility does not similarly
list ethical considerations. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., N.Y. Code of Prof'1
Responsibility tit. 22, § 1200 (2004). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also
do not list ethical considerations. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct (2003). Forty-
three states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands use a version of the
Model Rules. See A.B.A. Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and
Standards 637 (2004 ed.). Puerto Rico and the following states do not use the Model
Rules: California, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, and Oregon. Id. A "vast
majority of state and federal jurisdictions" adopted the Model Code after it was
created in 1969. Id. at 7. A "rethinking of the ethical premises and problems of the
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prosecutors possess the power and resources of the government,
whereas the defendant is, in many cases, indigent or limited by
significantly fewer resources.5 4  Additionally, prosecutors make
decisions on behalf of their client,5 unlike defense lawyers who must
serve the objectives of their client. Further, prosecutorial discretion is
virtually unchecked56 and unreviewable57 because judicial review of
prosecutors, who serve an executive function,58 would violate
constitutional separation of powers principles. In 1993, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that "[t]he Department of
Justice wields enormous power over people's lives, [which is] beyond
effective judicial or political review." 59 Further, a prosecutor has the
power to compel production of evidence, subpoena witnesses, and
grant immunity.60
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
governs prosecutorial misconduct through the Due Process Clause.
61
legal profession" led the American Bar Association to adopt the new restatement, the
Model Rules, in 1983, which most states now follow. Id. at 7-8. Although the Model
Rules do not contain the "aspirational" ethical considerations of the Model Code, see
Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility, Preliminary Statement, the current Model Code
and the Model Rules are substantially similar as to the rules discussed in this Note.
54. See Green, supra note 52, at 626.
55. See Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-13(2). Ethical Consideration 7-
13(2) provides that the prosecutor's special duty extends because "during trial the
prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may make decisions normally made by
an individual client, and those affecting the public interest should be fair to all." Id.
The New York Code does not similarly list ethical considerations. See N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 1200.
56. See Green, supra note 52, at 627.
57. See Douglass, supra note 36, at 226. A prosecutor bases his decision on his
"personal judgment... without further technical and potentially artificial
restrictions." Id. at 227.
58. At the federal level, the President appoints the Attorney General and the
United States Attorneys, but the United States Attorneys generally hire their
assistants on a "non-partisan, merit-oriented basis." 1 LaFave et al., supra note 32, §
1.2(f), at 54 nn.228, 230. At the state level, most local prosecutors are elected, and
they may or may not hire assistants based on political affiliation. 1 id.
59. United States v. Van Engel, 15 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 1993) (reversing a
judge's dismissal of several counts against a defendant because the prosecutor's
"ineptitude" and "misconduct" was insufficient to justify acquitting a defendant, as is
true in all but the most egregious cases).
60. See Green, supra note 52, at 626 (quoting N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l
Ethics, Formal Op. 683, at 3 (1996)). The United States Attorneys' Manual and
ethical rules caution prosecutors to use this discretion soundly. Dep't of Justice, Dep't
of Justice Manual, U.S. Attorneys' Manual tit. 9, § 9-27.110 (2d ed. 2004) (stating that
a "prosecutor has wide latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even whether
to prosecute for apparent violations of Federal criminal law" and further noting that
the Constitution charges the executive branch with ensuring that laws are "faithfully
executed") [hereinafter Dep't of Justice Manual]; Standards Relating to the Admin.
of Criminal Justice Standard 3-1.2(b) (3d ed. 1992) (stating that "the prosecutor must
exercise sound discretion"). See generally Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-
13, 7-14.
61. See Green, supra note 52, at 619.
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The Due Process Clause62  protects people from arbitrary
governmental procedures by requiring all defendants to be afforded
similar treatment by the justice system. This includes treating
lawbreakers equally and not punishing them "more harshly than
deserved. 63 As a "minister of justice and not simply... an advocate,"
a prosecutor should be disinterested.' Furthermore, prosecutors are
expected to deliver justice "impartially"65 by ensuring the fairness of
the justice system and acting with an overall view toward the public
good.66 Prosecutors have an additional duty of ensuring that the
defendant receives procedural justice. 67 Thus, a prosecutor serves the
dual role of protecting the defendant 68 as well as representing the
government.
Defense attorneys suggest that prosecutorial power in plea
bargaining is too great, especially if it limits a defendant's right to a
fair trial.69 When he was a criminal defense attorney, Judge Jed S.
Rakoff of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York wrote that many indigent defendants plead guilty mainly
because "they quickly ascertain that their appointed counsel cannot
62. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
63. See Green, supra note 52, at 634.
64. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2003); Model Code of Prof'I
Responsibility EC 7-13. Ethical Consideration 7-13 provides that "[t]he responsibility
of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek
justice, not merely to convict" (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 79 (1935)).
Id. The New York Code does not similarly list ethical considerations. See N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. & Regs tit. 22, § 1200 (2004). For more discussion of a prosecutor's
obligation of neutrality, see H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor. The
Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1695, 1697
(2000).
65. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
66. See Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-13(2); Dep't of Justice Manual,
supra note 60, at tit. 9, § 9-27.730(A)(2) (noting that one reason for a prosecutor to
recommend a sentence is when "[t]he public interest warrants an expression of the
government's view concerning the appropriate sentence").
67. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs tit. 22, § 1200.3(5) (codifying the Model Code);
Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(5) ("A lawyer shall not [e]ngage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."); Model Rules of Prof'l
Conduct R. 8.4(d) ("It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."); Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct
R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (stating that a prosecutor's role is as a "minister of justice and not simply
that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that
the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis
of sufficient evidence"); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45, 49
(1991) (clarifying prosecutors' abstract ethical duty to seek "justice").
68. See Uviller, supra note 64, at 1697.
69. Jed S. Rakoff, How Can You Defend Those Crooks?, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 25, 1990,
at 3 (noting that judges have a "blatant and continuing bias in favor of the
prosecution" citation omitted)).
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hope to mount a meaningful defense on their behalf."7  Because
appointed defense attorneys may not have adequate time to devote to
representing their clients and the defendants do not want to risk a
heftier sentence after trial, the defendants often choose to plead
guilty. Prosecutors, however, should not unfairly benefit from this
situation because they have a responsibility that is "moral if not legal
[to use a] prudent and restrained exercise" of power.71 When
prosecutors violate ethical or internal guidelines, however, they are
rarely disciplined.72  Therefore, the justice system relies on
prosecutors' integrity and honesty to aptly represent the public
interest.73
The United States Attorneys' Manual guides federal prosecutors in
their special role in plea bargaining.74 Prosecutors are responsible for
delivering "fair, evenhanded administration" of the law so that the
public and defendants have confidence that prosecutors base their
decisions on the "merits of each case."" Plea agreements are
expected to "reflect the totality and seriousness of the defendant's
conduct" and "charges are not to be bargained away or dropped,
unless the prosecutor has a good faith doubt as to the government's
ability readily to prove a charge for legal or evidentiary reasons."76
Prosecutors are expected to weigh several factors when plea
bargaining:
1. The defendant's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or
prosecution of others;
2. The defendant's history with respect to criminal activity;
3. The nature and seriousness of the offense or offenses charged;
4. The defendant's remorse or contrition and his/her willingness to
assume responsibility for his/her conduct;
5. The desirability of prompt and certain disposition of the case
6. The likelihood of obtaining a conviction at trial;
70. Id. (citation omitted). Judge Rakoff also was an assistant United States
attorney in the Southern District of New York from 1973-1980. 1 Almanac of the
Federal Judiciary, 2d Cir. 66 (2004).
71. United States v. Van Engel, 15 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 1993); Model Code of
Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-13(1); Green, supra note 52, at 629 (quoting Van Engel, 15
F.3d at 629).
72. Andrea Elliott, Prosecutors Not Penalized, Lawyer Says, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17,
2003, at B1 (discussing how "often egregious" prosecutorial misconduct in seventy-
two cases over twenty-one years contributed to sixty-two reversals, yet only one of
those prosecutors was disciplined).
73. Dep't of Justice Manual, supra note 60, at tit. 9, § 9-27.001.
74. See id. § 9-27.000.
75. Id. § 9-27.001.
76. Id. § 9-27.400(B).
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7. The probable effect on witnesses;
8. The probable sentence or other consequences if the defendant is
convicted;
9. The public interest in having the case tried rather than disposed of
by a guilty plea;
10. The expense of trial and appeal;
11. The need to avoid delay in the disposition of other pending
cases; and
12. The effect upon the victim's right to restitution.77
While plea bargaining is a useful prosecutorial tool, it cannot be
used to the detriment of prosecutorial duties, such as the prosecutor's
special duty to "seek justice '"78 and to protect defendants' rights.
Moreover, if a prosecutor does not have "sufficient admissible
evidence to support a conviction, ' 79 he has an ethical duty "to drop
the charges without exacting any price for doing so."" In provable
cases, however, charitable contributions can evidence a defendant's
"remorse or contrition"81 to aid the prosecutor in quickly and
effectively resolving the case. The next sections analyze the ethical
rules that limit prosecutors who seek to include charitable
contributions in plea agreements and judges who approve of them in
sentencing.
B. Prosecutorial Ethics in Plea Bargaining
Prosecutors are bound by various court-adopted and ethical rules,
yet no rule directly addresses whether prosecutors ethically can enter
into plea agreements permitting defendants to give a charitable
contribution. Even though a prosecutor does not violate a specific
ethical rule by engaging in such plea agreements, general ethical rules
indicate that abuse could evolve in this system. Rule 3.8 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), which is devoted to
prosecutorial ethics, notes the need for prosecutorial fairness in only
charging crimes that are supported by probable cause and in
77. Id. § 9-27.420(A)(1-12).
78. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-13 (2004); Standards Relating to
the Admin. of Criminal Justice Standard 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1992); see also Green, supra
note 52, at 607; Zacharias, supra note 67, at 107; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A.
Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 Geo. L.J. 207, 227 (2000)
(explaining how federal prosecutors differ from other attorneys in examining whether
federal prosecutors should be treated differently for ethics purposes).
79. Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice Standard 3-3.9(a) ("A
prosecutor should not.., permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the
absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction.").
80. Cowles v. Brownell, 538 N.E.2d 325,327 (N.Y. 1989).
81. Dep't of Justice Manual, supra note 60, at tit. 9, § 9-27.420(A)(4).
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disclosing evidence to the defense, 2 which may aid a defendant in
deciding whether to accept a plea. Another Model Rule, Rule 8.4,
prevents all attorneys, including prosecutors, from "engag[ing] in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."83  The
justice system has been established for several reasons: to have an
orderly society; to promote punitive retribution; to specifically and
generally deter crime; to rehabilitate or reform criminals; to keep
criminals off of the streets; to vindicate victims; and to avoid
vigilantism by assuring society that the government is punishing the
criminal for the harm done.84 Although general in language, Model
Rule 8.4 is integral in reminding prosecutors that they must uphold
the goals of criminal justice because of their special role in the
courts.85
Prosecutors ethically cannot participate in a case with which they
have conflicting interests. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Model Code") restricts an attorney from
representing a party when the lawyer's "personal interests" may
conflict with his professional judgment.86 The Standards Relating to
82. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.8 (2003); see also N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &
Regs. tit. 22, § 1200.34 (2004); Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-13.
83. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.4(d); see also N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &
Regs. tit 22, § 1200.3(5); Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(5).
84. See Dressier, supra note 18, § 2.03, at 15-18; Michele Cotton, Back with a
Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal
Punishment, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1313 (2000); John Hasnas, Once More unto the
Breach: The Inherent Liberalism of the Criminal Law and Liability for Attempting the
Impossible, 54 Hastings L.J. 1, 45-47 (2002); Ashley Paige Dugger, Note, Victim
Impact Evidence in Capital Sentencing: A History of Incompatibility, 23 Am. J. Crim.
L. 375,398-403 (1996).
85. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.4(d). See supra notes 67 and 83 and
accompanying text for more discussion of Rule 8.4(d) of the Model Rules. See also
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs tit. 22, § 1200.3(5); Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility
DR 1-102(A)(5).
86. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 5-101(A). Disciplinary Rule 5-
101(A) provides, "Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer
shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of
his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business,
property, or personal interests." Id.; see also N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs tit. 22, §
1200.20(a) (mirroring the Model Code, except that the conflict is permitted if a
"disinterested lawyer would believe that the representation of the client will not be
adversely affected thereby and the client consents ...."); Model Rules of Prof'l
Conduct R. 1.7. Rule 1.7 provides in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client
if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent
conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be
directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or
by a personal interest of the lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under
paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: (1) the lawyer reasonably
believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent
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the Administration of Criminal Justice ("Standards") specifically
caution prosecutors in this respect.87 Consequently, any connection
between the prosecutor and a charitable organization that a defendant
contributes to as part of a plea agreement could cause a prohibited
conflict of interest.
Finally, prosecutors must disclose the terms of plea agreements to
the court in circumstances where the law requires it. The Model Code
cautions that a lawyer cannot "[c]onceal or knowingly fail to disclose
that which he is required by law to reveal."8 Although not an ethical
mandate, the Standards further recommend that prosecutors
specifically "should assist the court in basing its sentence on complete
and accurate information," 9  which would include disclosing
information about charitable contributions that are part of plea
agreements to the sentencing judge. Additionally, the Model Code
prohibits lawyers from engaging in "conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, '"90 which a prosecutor violates if he
does not disclose terms of a plea agreement that the law requires him
to disclose.91 Thus, prosecutors ethically must disclose charitable
contributions if the law in their jurisdictions requires such disclosure;
otherwise, the Standards recommend that prosecutors disclose the
information to enable the judge to accurately understand the full
agreement.92
Another factor in assessing prosecutorial ethics is that the Model
Rules recognize the prosecutor's role as part advocate and part
judge.93 In administering justice, a prosecutor's "interest ... in a
criminal prosecution is not that [he or she] shall win a case, but that
representation to each affected client... land] (4) each affected client gives
informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Id.
87. Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice Standard 3-1.3(a) (3d
ed. 1992). Standard 3-1.3(a) states, "A prosecutor should avoid a conflict of interest
with respect to his or her official duties." Id.; see also id. at Standard 3-1.3(f).
Standard 3-1.3(f) provides that "[a] prosecutor should not permit his or her
professional judgment.., to be affected by his or her own political, financial,
business, property, or personal interests." Id. (emphasis added).
88. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(3); see also N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. & Regs tit. 22, § 1200.33(a)(3) (codifying the Model Code); Model Rules of
Prof'l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(2). Rule 3.3(a)(2) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel." Id.
89. Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice Standard 3-6.2(a).
90. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4); see also N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. & Regs tit. 22, § 1200.3(a)(4) (codifying the Model Code); Model Rules of
Prof'l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(1). Rule 3.3(a)(1) provides in relevant part that "a lawyer
shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal ...." Id.
91. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
93. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. 1; see also Model Code of Prof'l
Responsibility EC 7-13, 7-13(2).
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justice shall be done. 9 4  Rather than simply seeking convictions,
prosecutors are expected to prosecute only the guilty and to
recommend suitable sentences.95 Scholars label the prosecutor's role
as balancing between a "quasi-judicial" function and government
representative, and, therefore, many hold a prosecutor to a higher
standard than they hold other attorneys.96 Even if their quasi-judicial
role suggests that it may be appropriate to treat them similarly,
prosecutors are not subject to the same ethical rules as judges. For
example, judges are charged with avoiding any appearance of
impropriety,97 but no rule similarly requires prosecutors to do so.
Although the unique nature of prosecutors' duties to the public to
seek justice suggests that prosecutors also should be bound by the
judicial ethical rules,98 prosecutors are not held to the same standard
as judges.99
C. Judicial Ethics in Sentencing
While prosecutors have much discretion in entering plea
agreements and recommending sentences, the trial judge must
ultimately determine whether to accept the plea agreement to which a
prosecutor and a defendant agreed.1" In determining the sentence,
judges are expected to follow ethical rules set out by the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct ("Model Judicial Code"). °' Judges' ethical rules
are stricter than those of prosecutors in that judges must be careful to
94. See Green, supra note 52, at 614 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88 (1935)).
95. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
96. See Douglass, supra note 36, at 1, 5, 24-25; Bruce A. Green, Her Brother's
Keeper: The Prosecutor's Responsibility When Defense Counsel Has a Potential
Conflict of Interest, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. 323, 324 (1989); Kenneth J. Melilli,
Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. Rev. 669, 697 (1992);
Uviller, supra note 64, at 1697; Zacharias & Green, supra note 78, at 227; Michael Q.
English, Note, A Prosecutor's Use of Inconsistent Factual Theories of a Crime in
Successive Trials: Zealous Advocacy or a Due Process Violation?, 68 Fordham L.
Rev. 525, 528-29 (1999).
97. Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2 (2003). See infra note 102 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this judicial ethical rule.
98. Because of the impact that ethical rules have on the effective assistance of
counsel and law enforcement, policy concerns should be strongly considered when
interpreting disciplinary rules. See Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 645 (2d
Cir. 1995); see also In re Norton, 608 A.2d 328 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1992) (suspending
attorneys for misleading the court by dismissing a case after discovering that the
defendant had contributed to a police support organization).
99. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
100. People v. Farrar, 419 N.E.2d 864, 865 (N.Y. 1981) (noting that "the court must
perform the delicate balancing necessary to accommodate the public and private
interests represented in the criminal process").
101. The Federal Judicial Conference, the District of Columbia, and all states
except for Montana have adopted some version of the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. Jeffrey M. Shaman et al., Judicial Conduct and Ethics 3-5 (3d ed. 2000).
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avoid even the "appearance" of impropriety,010  whereas no
prosecutorial ethics rule maintains such a strict requirement. Judges
must meet these higher standards for the public to have confidence
that the judicial system is impartial and equitable. 103
In addition, courts have struck down cases with even a potential
conflict of interest for judges, or that could have given the appearance
that judges were otherwise biased because of the necessity for judges
to be impartial. In a landmark case in 1927, the Supreme Court
reversed a judgment allowing a judge's salary to depend partially on
whether he found a defendant guilty and assessed a fine." 4  Since
then, the Court has reversed convictions where judges had even less
direct pecuniary interest in the outcome because due process requires
judges to be "neutral and detached."1 5 These reversals exemplify the
high standard for ensuring that judges appear impartial. 106
Finally, judges are cautioned not to use the "prestige" of their office
to advance "private interests," which include the interests of
"others."'0 7  "Others" may include charitable organizations, as
another ethical canon of the Model Judicial Code does not permit
judges to solicit funds for charitable organizations. 08 Judges who
solicit funds for charitable organizations demonstrate bias that could
affect their ability to act impartially. 9 Hence, judges who permit plea
102. Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2. Canon 2 is entitled, "A Judge Shall
Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge's
Activities." Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id. at Canon 2(A) ("A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall
act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary." (footnote omitted)).
104. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531, 535 (1927) (reversing a defendant's
conviction because the judge had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case and,
thus, was not impartial).
105. See, e.g., Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) (reversing a
defendant's conviction because the judge was also the mayor and the funds levied
from the conviction helped comprise the mayor's budget).
106. Compare Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532, 535 (noting that due process requires a
defendant to have an impartial judge, even though "[tihere are doubtless mayors who
would not allow such a consideration as $12 costs in each case to affect their judgment
in it"), with Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980) (noting that agencies
could retain funds that prosecutors earned through penalties levied because
prosecutors are expected to be zealous enforcers and do not have to be neutral in the
same way that judges do).
107. Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2(B). Canon 2(B) provides that the
judge cannot use "the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the
judge or others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression
that they are in a special position to influence the judge." Id. (emphasis added).
108. Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 4(C)(3)(b). Canon 4(C)(3)(b)
provides that "[a] judge as an officer, director, trustee or non-legal advisor, or as a
member or otherwise: (i)... shall not personally participate in the solicitation of
funds or other fund-raising activities... (iv) shall not use or permit the use of the
prestige of judicial office for fund-raising or membership solicitation." Id. (emphasis
added).
109. Id. at Canon 4(A), cmt 2.
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agreements that include charitable contributions as part of the
sentence may violate the Model Judicial Code if their acquiescence
appears to promote a charitable organization. 10
After outlining the procedural and ethical limits on prosecutors and
judges in Part I, Part II analyzes how courts and bar committees have
treated plea bargains and sentences that include charitable
contributions. Part II.A examines how courts and bar committees
have reacted to judges who approve of charitable contributions in
sentences. Several opinions show that the appearance of impropriety
makes this an unethical practice for judges."1  Part II.B explains
courts and bar committees' reactions to prosecutors who include
charitable contributions in plea agreements. Many opinions suggest
that the benefits of these arrangements, such as creating unique
methods to punish corporate defendants,"12 make this practice ethical
for prosecutors. Further, Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2 demonstrate that
courts and bar committees find that prosecutors and judges ethically
may include charitable contributions in certain plea agreements.
II. COURTS' AND BAR COMMITTEES' RESPONSES TO USING
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS IN PLEA AGREEMENTS
Nothing legally prohibits prosecutors or judges from considering a
defendant's charitable contributions in charging or sentencing. There
are three ways charitable contributions may affect plea agreements
and sentences. First, prosecutors can weigh contributions that a
defendant gave on his own before the offense as a socially beneficial
act that demonstrates a potential for rehabilitation. Second, a
prosecutor can enter into a plea agreement that includes a condition
that the defendant must give a charitable contribution. Third, judges
can include charitable contributions as a term of the defendant's
sentence.
Charitable contributions can be a useful part of plea agreements,
similar to fines and community service.'13 Courts have used charitable
contributions in several types of cases," 4 including those that involved
violent crimes.115 Courts have found that contributions may assist in
110. See infra notes 136-64 and accompanying text (discussing cases where judges
were disciplined or reversed for including charitable contributions as part of
sentences).
111. See infra notes 136-64 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 172-81, 221 and accompanying text.
113. See infra Part III.C.
114. See infra notes 167-86, 201-26 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Hafner v. Leapley, 520 N.W.2d 252, 252-53 (S.D. 1994) (affirming the
sentencing judge's suspension of eight years of a thirteen-year sentence for second-
degree rape on the condition that the defendant have no contact with the victim, that
the defendant reimburse the victim for counseling services resulting from the offense,
and that the defendant pay a $5000 charitable contribution to the county's victim and
witness assistance program). To the author's knowledge, no murder cases have
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reforming criminal behavior and in rehabilitating defendants.116 Also,
the additional publicity that accompanies nontraditional sentences can
aid in general deterrence.1 7 Finally, this alternative sentencing option
provides prosecutors with a method to suitably sentence corporate
defendants who may not be well suited to traditional punishments.118
Using these contributions as part of sentences, however, raises
ethical concerns. If contributions are not related to the crime,
defendants and the public may not view charitable contributions as
punishment. 19 Consequently, the defendant may not adequately
compensate society for his crime and the deterrent effect of the
punishment may be lost. The defendant also may not adequately
compensate society for his crime if the prosecutor gives more weight
than is appropriate for a contribution, such as when a defendant
contributes a large sum. 20  Moreover, allowing charitable
contributions could create-or give the impression of-unequal
justice that wealthy people use as a "payoff.''. The option to
contribute may be available only for wealthy people accused of
crimes. or r defendant corporations who may not otherwise be
punished effectively. 23 Wealthy defendants, however, might not be
deterred from committing crimes, knowing that they can evade
traditional punishment by paying a contribution. Finally, this system
may create an unethical conflict of interest for the prosecutor or judge
if he has a connection to a charitable organization to which he
proposes that the defendant pay.'24 As this Note argues in Part III, in
certain situations it is appropriate for prosecutors to enter into these
types of plea agreements and for judges to approve them. Yet, the
aforementioned ethical issues illuminate several potential problems
permitted charitable contributions.
116. See infra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 172-81, 221 and accompanying text.
119. See Colquitt, supra note 41, at 717.
120. See, e.g., Daniel Wise, Setting Up of Trusts Behind Negotiations in Capital Case
Plea, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 10, 2004, at 1 (quoting the head of the Capital Defender Office as
calling financial conditions in capital cases "deeply troubling," referring to a case
where a prosecutor attempted to establish a life-without-parole deal for a criminal
defendant who had murdered his wife by requiring the defendant to create a $100,000
trust fund).
121. See Colquitt, supra note 41, at 768; see also Wise, supra note 120, at 1.
122. See, e.g., Leslie Eaton, A Son of the Ultrawealthy, Caught Up in the Pursuit of
Profit, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 2003, § 1, at 37 (discussing an affluent man who was able
to settle allegations of illegal trading with the New York Attorney General by
agreeing to pay $10 million in fines and to provide $30 million in restitution to
investors).
123. United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(upholding charitable contributions as a "creative" solution to deter criminal conduct
while not harming the community and employees who would become unemployed if
the corporation went bankrupt (quoting United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677
F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1982))).
124. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.7 (2003); see supra note 86.
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that prosecutors and judges should consider when using charitable
contributions as part of sentences.
There are no overarching guidelines for handling charitable
contributions in plea bargains. 125 The courts and bar committees that
have addressed the ethical questions raised by these plea agreements
are not consistent among the circuits, from one state to the next, and
sometimes even within the same state. For example, a Kansas ethics
committee determined that prosecutors could permit charitable
contributions in certain situations, 26 yet another committee in the
same state implied that it would not be ethical for judges to permit the
contributions in any situation. 127 This divergence of opinions confuses
whether the practice is permissible because the judge must impose the
final sentence. 28
Ethics committees and courts have distinguished between
prosecutors' and judges' ethical obligations governing charitable
contributions in plea agreements. 29  Courts that have upheld
contributions often noted that the contribution would aid in the
defendant's rehabilitation or would assist in structuring a creative
option to deter and punish corporate defendants. 3 ° Other courts have
not upheld contributions, noting that the potential benefits are
outweighed by the harm of the terms appearing as bribery or a
"payoff," diverting fine fees away from the government, or not
reasonably relating to the defendant's rehabilitation. 3'
A. Response to Judges Who Use Charitable Contributions in Sentences
Courts and bar committees disagree on whether it is ethical for
judges to impose sentences or to acquiesce to plea agreements that
include charitable contributions. 32 Part II.A.1 will discuss authorities
that do not favor the charitable contributions. These opponents argue
that judges who impose or approve of sentences that include
charitable contributions violate the ethical canons that prohibit judges
from using the prestige of the judicial office to advance private
interests, soliciting funds for charitable organizations, and appearing
improper. 33  Additionally, the opponents opine that these plea
agreements do not reasonably relate to rehabilitating the defendant,
or that the contributions to charitable organizations divert funds away
125. See supra Parts L.B-C.
126. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
128. See infra note 200.
129. See infra notes 136-226 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 167-81, 211-26 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 136-64, 189-200 and accompanying text.
132. See infra Parts II.A.1-2.
133. See infra notes 136-57 and accompanying text.
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from the city treasury."' Part II.A.2 will address those that permit the
charitable contributions. The proponents consider the interest of
justice served by such a punishment because the charitable
contributions can better rehabilitate a defendant and provide creative
sentencing in unique situations.135
1. Courts Finding Charitable Contributions in Plea Agreements
Unethical
Courts and bar committees generally advise against judges
permitting charitable contributions to be part of plea agreements,
citing ethical prohibitions of judges using the "prestige" of their office
to advance "private interests" and of judges soliciting funds for
charities.136 The Kansas judicial ethics committee, for example,
determined that a judge would violate ethical canons by allowing an
attorney to permit misdemeanor defendants to contribute $200 to a
charitable organization in lieu of a $300 fine.137 The committee found
that the judge would improperly advance the private interest of the
charity merely by imposing a sentence of a contribution to a charity
that the defendant selected.138 An Arizona committee stated that
even an agreement for a defendant to participate on a "victim impact
panel" was problematic and would violate the judicial canon against
fundraising. 139 Hence, a judge who approves of plea agreements that
include charitable contributions may violate the ethical rules against
advancing private interests and fundraising if someone perceives that
judge as connected to the charitable organization.140
Courts cite the judicial ethics canon of avoiding even the
appearance of impropriety' as a reason to prohibit judges from
134. See infra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 167-86 and accompanying text.
136. Kan. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. JE 108, at 1 (2001), available at
http://www.kscourts.org/jel08-110.pdf. This opinion quotes Canon 2B, 2000 Kan. Ct.
R. Annot. 472, which states that "A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office
to advance the private interests of .... others .. " It also quotes Canon 4C(4)(b),
2000 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 482, which provides that "A judge should not solicit funds for
any .... charitable .... organization, or use... the prestige of office for that
purpose." The Kansas rules are similar to Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canons
2(B) and 4(C)(b) (2003). See also In re Davis, 946 P.2d 1033, 1037, 1045 (Nev. 1997);
In re Richter, 409 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1022-23 (N.Y. Ct. Jud. 1977) (censuring a judge for
several improprieties, including conditionally discharging or dismissing charges after
ordering defendants to give charitable contributions, which violated the ethical canon
against soliciting funds for a charity).
137. Kan. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. JE 108, at 1.
138. Id.
139. Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 92-2, at 1 (1992) (disapproving of
the practice because Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, the organization that ran the
panel, charged $10 to participate, which the bar committee considered to be similar to
a charitable contribution).
140. Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canons 2(B) and 4(C)(b).
141. Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2.
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including charitable contributions as part of sentences. Using power
in a way that "convey[s] the impression" that a judge is promoting a
specific charity may create ambiguity regarding the judge's
neutrality. 42  In In re Storie, the Supreme Court of Missouri
suspended a judge because the judge "gave the appearance that
justice was for sale in his court.' 1 43 Further, even though the judge
may not have intended to give such an appearance, the public could
have perceived that his actions were not neutral by his approval of this
system.'" In responding to how he thought the defendants would
perceive the contribution, the judge said, "I think they thought they
bought their way out of it.' 45 Even if a judge has not violated any
specific ethical rule, therefore, he can still violate his ethical duties
because someone could perceive his actions as wrong.
Bar committees also cite the canon to avoid the appearance of
impropriety146 when prohibiting judges from including charitable
contributions in sentences. A Hawaii ethics committee admonished a
judge who required that attorneys or parties pay sanctions47 to
charitable organizations. 48  The committee said that the sanctions
were improper because they "creat[ed] the appearance that the judge
[wa]s abusing [his or her] discretion to help charities or to increase his
or her popularity by helping charities.' 1 49 Moreover, the committee
said that even if the judge's intention were proper, the potential that it
could appear as if he were using his power to raise charitable funds
caused the action to be inappropriate. 5 ° A Florida ethics committee
used similar reasons to disapprove of a defendant's probation that
required charitable contributions. 5' The committee members opined,
however, that the arrangement could be acceptable if both of the
parties stated that the contribution was not from "any suggestion or
promises by the court and [was] entirely the result of negotiations
between the state and/or victims of the defendant.' ' 52 Hence, ethics
142. Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 84-11, at 1, 2
(1984) (disapproving of judges' practice of requiring criminal defendants to make
contributions to charities of the judges' choosing as part of the sentences).
143. In re Storie, 574 S.W.2d 369, 375 (Mo. 1978) (suspending the judge for
approving a prosecutor's system of permitting criminal defendants to pay into the
"library fund" to buy books for the dilapidated courthouse in exchange for dismissing
or reducing charges).
144. Id. at 374.
145. Id.
146. Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2.
147. Sanctions are penalties for "failure to comply with a law, rule, or order."
Black's Law Dictionary 1341 (7th ed. 1999).
148. Haw. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, Formal Op. 01-01, at 1, 2 (2001) (stating
that the judge distorted the purpose of sanctions, which is to "compel compliance with
court rules" and not to "raise funds for charities").
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting In re Merritt, 432 N.W.2d 170 (Mich. 1988)).
151. Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 87-6, at 1 (1987).
152. Id. at 2.
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committees may approve of judges administering sentences with
charitable contributions if the prosecutor recommended the
contribution and not the judge.
Additionally, the fear that people could perceive a charitable
contribution as a bribe leads courts and bar committees to disallow
the practice for judges."l 3 The Indiana Commission on Judicial
Qualifications would not permit contributions because they deemed
the sentence a "pay-off." '154 The Nevada state court in In re Davis
attributed the problem to a concern that defendants could be
"intimidated into making contributions when solicited by a judge ...
or that they may expect future favors in return for their largesse." '155
Furthermore, a commission in Missouri found that the option of
paying a charitable contribution created a problem of unequal justice
if only wealthier offenders "who have the means to buy out of
community service work" '156 can enter into these types of plea
agreements. These agreements gave the appearance that judges
determined sentences based on the financial contribution,'57 which
compromised their necessary neutrality.
Diverting funds to charity that would otherwise go to the
government treasury as a fine also offends federal appellate courts.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated in United States
v. Haile that if the city was intended to receive the funds according to
statute, a charity could not receive the funds instead, even if the
charitable contribution would better serve the community.'58 The
court added, however, that a judge can consider a defendant's
charitable contributions when sentencing; he simply cannot compel a
defendant to give the contributions.'59 A Florida committee went as
far as comparing the situation to giving judges the "authority to
tax.""16  As a result, the judges' selection of who received funds
intended for the city made these sentences improper.
Finally, one court reversed a charitable contribution as part of a
sentence because the contribution did not relate to the defendant's
153. See infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
154. See Ratliff v. State, 596 N.E.2d 241, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
155. In re Davis, 946 P.2d 1033, 1045 (Nev. 1997) (removing a judge for various
unethical acts, including allowing criminal defendants to contribute to charities
chosen from a list that the judge had created in lieu of paying fines to the city)
(quoting Jeffrey M. Shaman et al., Judicial Conduct and Ethics § 9.06, at 289 (2d ed.
1995)).
156. Mo. Comm'n on Ret., Removal and Discipline, Op. 173, Mar. 2,1999, LEXIS,
Ethics Library, Mojeth File.
157. Id.
158. United States v. Haile, 795 F.2d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 1986) (reversing a
sentencing judge who reduced part of the defendant's fine for committing an antitrust
violation as long as the defendant gave some money to a charitable organization).
159. Id.
160. Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 84-11, at 1, 2
(1984).
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rehabilitation.61 In State v. Dominguez, the Court of Appeals of New
Mexico remanded a sentence that permitted a defendant to give a
$500 contribution to the sheriff's office because the contribution was
not "reasonably related to [the defendant's] rehabilitation since the
Sheriff's Office was unaggrieved by [his] actions." '162 The court used a
definition of "fine" to evidence that it is a court-ordered payment for
punishment, while a "donation" is defined as "a voluntary
payment.', 163 Consequently, the court determined that a fine would
have been appropriate in this situation, whereas the contribution was
not. 6
2. Courts Finding Charitable Contributions in Plea Agreements
Permissible
In reasoning analogous to the New Mexico court in Dominguez, 65
some courts have affirmed sentences with charitable contributions
when the contributions could assist in rehabilitating a defendant in a
way that traditional punishments could not. 166 In State v. Pieger, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed a sentence of a jail term and a
$2500 contribution to the defendant's hit-and-run victim's treating
hospital.167  The court reasoned that the contribution was "an
appropriate vehicle by which to help the defendant accept
responsibility for the consequences of his conduct," and the
contribution could ensure that the defendant's probation period
would serve as a time of "'genuine rehabilitation." '1 68  Further, the
court stated that the contribution would better rehabilitate the
defendant than a traditional fine because the contribution "'force[d]
the defendant to confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions
have caused'' while a fine that is paid to the state would be "'an
abstract and impersonal entity.""69 Thus, the court reasoned that not
161. State v. Dominguez, 853 P.2d 147, 159 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
162. Id.
163. Id. (noting that the court did not give the defendant a true choice by offering
for him to choose between paying the $500 contribution or a $5000 fine for his
aggravated battery conviction, as the fine was so much greater than the donation).
164. Id.
165. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
167. State v. Pieger, 680 A.2d 1001, 1006 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996), affd, 692 A.2d
1273, 1280 (Conn. 1997) (noting that the contribution as "one part of a plan of action
by the court to rehabilitate the defendant," helped to cause the defendant to be
"aware of the damage he has wrought as a result of his offense").
168. Pieger, 692 A.2d at 1276, 1278 (quoting State v. Graham, 33 Conn. App. 432,
448 (1994)).
169. Id. at 1278 (quoting People v. Carbajal, 899 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1995)) (holding that
restitution helped to reform and deter the defendant who had committed a similar
crime as the defendant in Pieger). The court in Pieger analogized the argument that
permitted restitution in Carbajal with the determination to permit charitable
contributions: "'[T]he direct relation between the harm and the punishment gives
[the charitable contribution] a more precise deterrent effect than a traditional fine."'
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only was the sentence reasonably related to the crime, but also the
charitable contribution was beneficial in that it could improve the
defendant's rehabilitation. 70
Courts have upheld sentences that include charitable contributions
for corporate defendants because such contributions aid in
rehabilitating and deterring entities in a way that traditional
punishments cannot.171 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found that "unique and creative" sentences often were
necessary to punish corporate defendants that cannot be punished
with incarceration. 72  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, in United States v. William Anderson Co., upheld the trial
court's order of a combination of community service and
contributions to a community project over the government's
objection.1 73 Here, the court stated that this sentence was preferable
to incarceration because the creative arrangement was "constructive"
and productive while it still "disrupted [the defendants] in their usual
routines and styles of life."' 74 In United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., a
New York district court approved a sentence requiring a defendant
corporation to give baked goods to needy organizations on a regular
basis. 75 The court approved of the charitable contribution because it
would assist in deterring future misconduct and because a reasonable
relationship existed between the sentence and the illegal conduct.176
Further, the publicity that results from such sentences aids in
deterring others from crime, and the staying power of the sentence
acts as a specific deterrent and continual reminder to company
employees of their violation.177  In Danilow Pastry, the court
intentionally chose beneficiaries that would create more public
awareness. 78 Additionally, the sentence avoided creating
unemployment and harming the community, for significant fines
Id. (quoting Carbajal, 899 P.2d at 73).
170. Id. at 1276.
171. See infra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
172. United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1982)
(affirming an option that allowed the corporate defendants to pay a fine or work with
and contribute to a community program).
173. United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 912 (8th Cir. 1982)
(stating that the agreement "will not have decreased the amount of punishment, but
will have increased the usefulness and decreased the expensiveness of it"); cf. Fox
Butterfield, With Cash Tight, States Reassess Long Jail Terms, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10,
2003, at Al (discussing new laws that emphasize treatment over incarceration as a
way to save money while treating the drug problem in Washington).
174. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d at 912.
175. United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1164-66 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (joining the contributions with the corporation's probation for violating the
Sherman Antitrust Act).
176. Id. at 1166.
177. Id. at 1167.
178. Id.
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would have left the defendants in bankruptcy.'79 The government
objected to the sentence because "reparations" only may be given to a
victim, and here there was no nominal victim.' ° The court approved
the creative sentence, however, because it served the "interests of
justice" in this situation that did not have a specific victim.' The
opportunity to give charitable contributions as retribution for the
corporate defendants' crimes gave judges opportunities to deter and
rehabilitate corporate misconduct when incarceration was not an
option or where enormous fines would harm employees who had done
nothing wrong.
Courts have stated that approval of this type of sentencing is not
absolute, but instead that it is appropriate only in certain
circumstances. The Appellate Court of Connecticut asserted, as had
the Florida ethics committee that did not approve of a contribution in
a sentence, that to permit a charitable contribution in a sentence, all
parties must agree to the terms of the sentencing.18 2  Another
circumstance that generally leads the courts to approve these
sentences is when the defendant has chosen the charity to which he is
contributing. 3 Further, courts have approved of judges creating
restrictions on the charitable contributions. For example, in Campbell
v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's choice
to forgo a $50,000 fine in lieu of paying a $40,000 non-tax deductible
contribution to a charity that was housed by his employer.' 8 The
dissent argued that the contribution was like a fine that simply
diverted funds from the federal treasury. 5 The majority stated,
179. Id. at 1166-67.
180. Id. at 1170-71 (internal quotations omitted).
181. Id. at 1167, 1171 (explaining that the public was the victim and serving needy
people was "symbolic restitution," which can be "an important element of general
criminal deterrence").
182. See State v. Stellato, 523 A.2d 1345, 1349 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (affirming a
court-approved agreement that the defendant would pay a $10,000 charitable
contribution as part of his sentence for conspiracy to steal oil because the defendant
agreed to the terms at the pre-sentencing hearing, the defendant did not object at
sentencing, and the defendant chose the charity); see also supra notes 151-52 and
accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Ratliff v. State, 596 N.E.2d 241, 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming a
court-approved plea agreement where two defendants pleaded guilty to driving under
the influence in exchange for sentences that included the defendants paying $50 and
$75 to charities that they chose); cf supra notes 137-38, 155 (citing instances where a
bar committee and court did not approve of contributions as part of sentences when
the judges chose the charities to which the defendants contributed).
184. Campbell v. State, 551 N.E.2d 1164, 1169 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that the
court could impose conditions on the donation that were reasonable under the
circumstances, as here where the employee had stolen more than $250,000 from his
employer). The defendant also had to pay restitution on top of the contribution. Id.
185. Id. at 1171 (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Mo. Valley
Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1549-50 (8th Cir. 1984)). Judge Sullivan noted that courts
could be blamed for randomly selecting a beneficiary when others may have a valid
claim to the funds. Id. (citation omitted).
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however, that "[t]he trial court did not abuse its discretion" in
allowing the defendant to choose this option and in imposing
restrictions on the contribution in this circumstance. 186 Hence, while
some courts bar judges from allowing charitable contributions in
sentences per se, others have considered the fairness of sentences that
include charitable contributions on a case-by-case analysis.
B. Response to Prosecutors Who Use Charitable Contributions in Plea
Agreements
Bar committees and courts are divided on whether prosecutors
ethically can participate in plea agreements that include charitable
contributions. A few courts and bar committees do not permit
prosecutors to enter into these types of plea agreements because they
inhibit the administration of justice, create a conflict of interest, and
foster dishonesty with the court.187 Other courts and bar committees
permit prosecutors to do so, explaining that prosecutors do not violate
ethical rules by participating in these plea agreements, the prosecutors
are entrusted with much discretion that includes giving these types of
recommendations, and the contributions assist in the defendant's
rehabilitation and deterrence.8 8
1. Courts Finding Charitable Contributions in Plea Agreements
Unethical
One bar committee compared prosecutors' ethical duty to not
prejudice the administration of justice when they enter into plea
agreements that include charitable contributions with the ethical
duties that judges face when they approve these plea agreements
because prosecutors and judges share certain responsibilities. 189 The
Ethics Committee of the North Carolina State Bar determined that it
was unethical for prosecutors to ask a defendant to give a charitable
contribution in lieu of a fine because of the implication that "justice
can be purchased." 1" Including charitable contributions in sentences
was considered unethical for judges because of the appearance of
impropriety.' Similarly, the committee stated that the ethics
violation occurred for prosecutors because of the prejudice to the
186. Campbell, 551 N.E.2d at 1169 (imposing restrictions that the contribution
could not be tax deductible and could not be acknowledged in any form by the
charitable organization).
187. See infra notes 189-200 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 201-26 and accompanying text.
189. See Nat'l Reporter on Legal Ethics & Prof'] Responsibility, N.C. Op. RPC
204, at 43 (1995) (revised); see also supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
190. Nat'l Reporter on Legal Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, N.C. Op. RPC 204
(revised), at 43.
191. See supra notes 141-57.
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"administration of justice., 192 The bar committee cited prosecutors'
special role of seeking justice as a reason prosecutors must be fair to
the defendant when offering plea agreements. 193
In another state, a bar committee would not permit prosecutors to
allow contributions when the practice creates a conflict of interest.
The New York State Bar Association's Committee on Professional
Ethics opined that any significant interest that a prosecutor had in a
charitable organization could create an impermissible conflict-even
if that conflict only created "an appearance of impropriety."'94 The
committee offered several examples of conflicting interests, including
a district attorney earning a salary as the coordinator of a program
that collects fines from drunk driving violations; a prosecutor devoting
significant time or money to an organization that he then includes in
the plea arrangement; and a prosecutor's close relative who is on the
board of such an organization.'95 Prosecutors are not permitted to
have a special interest that could taint their duty to seek justice. 96
Finally, courts and bar committees have not supported concealing
terms of plea agreements, including charitable contributions, from the
sentencing judge or the victim. The Supreme Court of Virginia
disciplined a prosecutor for acting unethically in entering a plea
agreement that included a charitable contribution because the
prosecutor had concealed information about a contribution from both
the court and the victim. 97 First, the prosecutor in Morrissey v.
Virginia State Bar misled the victim about the plea agreement by not
informing her that the criminal defendant was financially capable of
doubling her restitution had the defendant not distributed half of his
funds to charitable organizations. 98 Second, the prosecutor hid the
contributions from the court.' 99 A New York bar committee also
determined that concealing this type of plea bargaining information is
192. Nat'l Reporter on Legal Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, N.C. Op. RPC 204, at
43.
193. Id. (quoting N.C. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 7.3 cmt. (1995)) (stating that a
prosecutor's role is "to seek justice, not merely to convict").
194. N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 770, at 69, 77 (2003).
195. Id. at 72, 75.
196. See, e.g., People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 315 (Cal. 1996, modified, 1997)
(dismissing the prosecution of an alleged theft of trade secrets because the
prosecutors had a conflict of interest by pursuing the crime when a competitor
company paid for part of the investigation).
197. Morrissey v. Va. State Bar, 448 S.E.2d 615, 618-19 (Va. 1994) (affirming a
prosecutor's suspension for arranging a plea agreement where the defendant paid
$25,000 to his rape victim and $25,000 to charities that the prosecutor chose in
exchange for a guilty plea to lesser charges and suspended jail time).
198. Id.; Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4) (2004) (see supra
note 90 and accompanying text (citing text of DR 1-102(A)(4))).
199. Morrissey, 448 S.E.2d at 619 (noting that the prosecutor also asked the
defendant to hide the full terms of the agreement from the court); Model Code of
Prof'l Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(3); Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal
Justice Standard 3-6.2(a) (3d ed. 1992).
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unethical because it perpetrates a fraud on the court. 00 As a result,
charitable contributions that might otherwise be proper in plea
agreements can be improper if the terms of the agreement are hidden
from the court.
2. Courts Finding Charitable Contributions in Plea Agreements
Permissible
Bar committees that have supported prosecutors who include
charitable contributions as part of plea agreements have noted that
these arrangements do not violate any ethical rules as long as the
prosecutor is not connected to the charitable organization.2 0 1 The
New York State Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics
determined that this type of legally permissible sentence does not
violate any ethical issues.2 0 2  Without any connection to the
organization, prosecutors who enter into plea agreements that include
charitable contributions do not violate an ethical rule.20 3
Courts and bar committees have upheld situations where
prosecutors have an indirect interest in the prosecution, however,
because prosecutors, as advocates, are expected to use their discretion
neutrally and separate personal feelings from their decisions.2' Asset
forfeiture is a method that the government uses to freeze and seize
criminal defendants' profits after the government has proven that
there was probable cause that the property has been used for or
gained by criminal activity.2 5 The government has discretion as to
how to use the seized funds.2 6  Although different that charitable
contributions, the interest that prosecutors have in asset forfeiture is
analogous to, or greater than, their interest would be in a charity.
Sometimes losing the property that the defendant illicitly gained
distresses the defendant more than serving time would. When
200. N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 770, at 69, 79 (2003) (citing
Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 7-102(A)(3), which mirror
N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs. tit. 22, §§ 1200.3(a)(4), 1200.33(a)(3), respectively, and
People v. Farrar, 419 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that the sentencing judge has
the ultimate responsibility of determining appropriate sentences, regardless of plea
terms to which prosecutors and defendants have agreed)).
201. Id. at 72, 74-75; cf. supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
202. N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 770, at 72, 74-75.
203. Id.
204. See supra note 106.
205. Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, What Constitutes Establishment of Prima Facie
Case for Forfeiture of Personal Property Used in Illegal Manufacture, Processing, or
Sale of Controlled Substances Under § 511 of Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act (21 U.S.C.A. § 881), 167 A.L.R. Fed. 365, § 2a, at 392-93 (2001)
(identifying the purpose of asset forfeiture as "a system for the control of drug traffic
and to prevent the abuse of drugs" (citing United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp.
364 (W.D. Pa. 1971))).
206. See Linda J. Candler. Tracinz and Recoverine Proceeds of Crime in Fraud
Cases: A Comparison of U.S. and U.K. Legislation, 31 Int'l Law. 3, 39 (1997).
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prosecutors choose to prosecute asset forfeiture cases, the seizures
serve as a way to limit the profit of the crime, assisting to deter
criminal behavior. In Montana, the State Bar of Montana's Ethics
Committee advised that a prosecutor did not have an unethical
conflict of interest by prosecuting asset forfeiture cases, even though
he knew that half of his salary came from the funds seized.2 7 The
committee reasoned that a prosecutor-unlike a judge-is an
advocate who is not expected to be "impartial or unbiased," but the
prosecutor still must be fair in using discretion and in not allowing any
personal interest in a case to "interfere with his/her professional
judgment. '208 The committee did not consider using the assets seized
to hire a prosecutor to be an impermissible interest, thus permitting
asset forfeiture prosecutions as long as the prosecutor's reasons for
seeking them were "objective., 29
Asset forfeiture can be analogized to charitable contributions
because the prosecutor may have an indirect interest in seeing the
funds go toward an organization that he is interested in, even if he is
not personally receiving the funds. The New York Bar Committee
approved of plea agreements that included charitable contributions to
an organization that partly funded the District Attorney's office.210
Consequently, a prosecutor's indirect financial interest in a
prosecution has not caused courts and bar committees to deem the
relationship unethical.
As when the courts determined judges to have acted ethically when
sentences with charitable contributions advanced a defendant's
211siiarehabilitation, courts similarly have permitted prosecutors to
include charitable contributions as a part of defendants' probation
when the contributions can aid in the defendant's rehabilitation.212 A
Colorado appellate court upheld a $5000 contribution to a drug-
treatment program for a defendant who had pleaded guilty to
unlawfully dispensing a controlled substance in the course of his
practice as a doctor.213 The court permitted the contribution to be
part of the plea agreement because the contribution reasonably
207. Nat'l Reporter on Legal Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Mont. Ethics Op.
960827, at 14 (1996) (noting that funds earned through seizing drug profits
contributed to about $27,000 of the prosecutor's approximate $55,000 annual salary).
The Montana ethics opinion describes the Montana Asset Forfeiture Statute as
permitting seized property to be sold, with the proceeds going into an account to aid
local drug law enforcement. Id.
208. Compare id. at 15, with supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
209. Nat'l Reporter on Legal Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Mont. Ethics Op.
960827, at 14-15.
210. N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 770, at 69, 72-73 (2003).
211. See supra notes 167-74.
212. See infra notes 213-14.
213. State v. Burleigh, 727 P.2d 873, 874 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (permitting the




related to the defendant's rehabilitation and helped to deter the
defendant and others from committing similar crimes. 14 Hence,
charitable contributions can be used to aid the defendant to
understand the seriousness of his crime.1 5
As courts have imposed restrictions on judges who include
contributions in sentences to permit the practice to be ethical,1 6
prosecutors have been likewise limited. 17 When asked if prosecutors
ethically may reduce traffic tickets to non-moving violations if the
defendants pay charitable contributions in addition to fines, a Kansas
ethics committee suggested that prosecutors abide by an established
list of requirements that the Attorney General's office follows in
allowing civil parties to make charitable contributions as part of
settlements.2 18  The requirements that made this procedure ethical
include prohibiting the funds from being diverted away from the local
government, allowing the defendant to choose the charitable
organization, ensuring that the defendant has the option of rejecting
the plea agreement entirely, and requiring the prosecutor not to ask
the defendant to contribute to a religious organization. 21 9  These
requirements illustrate that this ethics committee-as did the
Appellate Court of Connecticut 220 -considers charitable contributions
with plea agreements to be ethical, in part, as long as the defendant
maintains control over part of the process.
Furthermore, prosecutors have generally unreviewable discretion as
to whether to bring charges initially. Sentencing judges are less likely
to require white-collar business defendants to serve jail time than
other criminal defendants for several reasons: prosecutors have
difficulty proving the elements of the offense to a jury; white-collar
defendants generally are not recidivists nor suited to incarceration;
and white-collar defendants often have given charitable
contributions.221 Michael R. Milken, the junk bond financier who
pleaded guilty to six felony charges of securities fraud and conspiracy
in 1990, was a rare corporate defendant who served jail time in
addition to the large fines and penalties that he agreed to pay. One
214. Id. at 875.
215. Id. (noting that it would be in the "best interests of the public").
216. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
217. See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
218. Nat'l Reporter on Legal Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Kan. Op. 93-02, at 35-
37 (1993).
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
221. Kurt Eichenwald, White-Collar Defense Stance: The Criminal-less Crime, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 3, 2002, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3 (asking "[hiow is it that someone is
more likely to go to jail for robbing a liquor store than for defrauding the equivalent
of the population of a mid-sized city?" and noting that the money for the charitable
contributions was likely "obtained illicitly").
222. See Kurt Eichenwald, Milken Defends "Junk Bonds" as He Enters his Guilty
Plea, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1990, at At (describing an agreement to pay $600 million
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prosecutor dropped potential criminal contempt charges for a
defendant corporation that "possibly" destroyed evidence of alleged
chemical dumping that damaged crops when the defendant
corporation agreed to give $11 million to fund legal ethics' chairs at
Georgia's four law schools and an annual symposium. 223 Prosecutors
sometimes do not criminally charge corporations when the officers
have given large contributions, particularly in civil environmental
cases; this practice has not been deemed unethical. 224 The New York
Bar Committee also supported this practice for the same reasons that
it permitted lesser charges as part of plea bargains that included
charitable contributions.225 The committee stated that a guilty plea is
not ethically required to resolve potentially criminal behavior when a
prosecutor has required the potential defendant to give a charitable
contribution.
226
The next part argues that including charitable contributions in plea
agreements and sentences can be done without violating an ethical
duty. Part III.A proposes a system for guiding prosecutors and judges
who choose to use charitable contributions as part of plea agreements
or sentences. Parts III.B through III.D apply the proposed system to
hypothetical situations implicating prosecutorial discretion, judicial
sentencing, and conflicts of interest to determine whether these
situations, drawn from the issues discussed in Part II, should be
considered ethical. Finally, Part III.E evaluates issues of unequal
justice that may arise in other hypothetical plea agreements involving
charitable contributions under the proposed system.
and serve ten years in jail); Eichenwald, supra note 221. The sentence was later
reduced to twenty-two months. Russ Mitchell, White-Collar Criminal? Pack Lightly
for Prison, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 2002, § 3 (Money & Business), at 4.
223. See Colquitt, supra note 41, at 720 (citing Roy M. Sobelson, Legal Ethics, 51
Mercer L. Rev. 353, 370 (1999) (citing In re El DuPont de Nemours & Co., 918 F.
Supp. 1524 (M.D. Ga. 1995), rev'd, 99 F.3d 363 (11th Cir. 1996))).
224. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 33-36, In re Tutu Water Wells Contamination
Litigation, 120 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 1997) (No. 96-7385) (arguing that the court assessed
"arbitrary" fines to the defendant corporation to build prison facilities that the city
needed even though there was no "nexus" between the charged environmental
violations and the charitable recipient, noting that the amount could have varied
depending on the charity the court chose).
225. N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 770, at 69, 78 (2003) (citing
Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice Standard 3-3.8(a) (3d ed.
1992)). Standard 3-3.8(a) states, "The prosecutor should consider in appropriate
cases the availability of noncriminal disposition, formal or informal, in deciding
whether to press criminal charges which would otherwise be supported by probable
cause; especially in the case of a first offender, the nature of the offense may warrant
noncriminal disposition." Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice
Standard 3-3.8(a).
226. N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 770, at 78.
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III. RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF PLEA BARGAINS THAT INCLUDE
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
A system that allows defendants to include charitable contributions
as part of their sentences can benefit prosecutors, defendants, and
society by providing ways for prosecutors to more aptly punish
defendants, allowing defendants alternate ways to pay for their
crimes, and giving more opportunities to rehabilitate and deter
criminals. Such a plea bargaining program, however, unintentionally
may encourage prosecutors to violate ethical duties unless rules
governing these plea agreements are established. Accordingly, this
part recommends a structure for creating a system that ethically could
permit charitable contributions as part of plea bargains in certain
criminal cases while adhering to the lawyers' ethical obligations.
Finally, this part addresses whether certain hypothetical situations
would be ethical under the proposed system.
A. Proposal for a Workable System that Allows Charitable
Contributions
Charitable contributions ethically can be used as part of plea
agreements, provided that there is a system in place with adequate
limitations. Factors that should be considered in evaluating whether it
is ethical for prosecutors to enter into the plea agreements and for
judges to approve of them include: (1) the situation surrounding the
offense; (2) the financial situation of the defendant; (3) the degree to
which the contribution can affect the sentence; and (4) the
appropriateness of the charities.
1. The Situation Surrounding the Offense
For the prosecutor to avoid violating the Model Rule against
prejudicing the administration of justice,227 the circumstances
surrounding the offense should determine whether the case meets the
threshold for allowing a charitable contribution as part of the
sentence. If the crime that the defendant is charged with is generally
punishable by jail time, a charitable contribution is not a sufficient
sentence in itself because it cannot alone fulfill the needs of
"justice., 228 A contribution should not serve in lieu of the total jail
time because punishing a defendant by controlling his liberty serves a
different purpose than directing him to pay a fine or charitable
contribution. For example, a judge may sentence a defendant to a jail
term because the violent nature of the crime may necessitate
incarceration to protect the public. If, however, the crime is
227. See supra notes 67 and 83 and accompanying text for more discussion of Rule
8.4(d) of the Model Rules.
228. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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punishable by either a fine or incarceration or if the judge has
suspended the jail time, a charitable contribution could be a proper
part of the punishment because the legislature or court already has
determined that a non-incarceration penalty may be appropriate.
Therefore, a charitable contribution is suitable as a substitute for a
fine or an addition to probation.
Furthermore, a charitable contribution might be appropriate when
a fine does not serve the purposes of justice sufficiently. For example,
with corporate defendants, the publicity may be more useful in
rehabilitation and deterrence than a fine large enough to bankrupt a
company.229  In another situation, charitable contributions may
provide an opportunity for the defendant to pay for his crime in a case
that otherwise may be nullified by a jury, lacks coherent witnesses, or
has a non-cooperative victim, as in the Fagan case described in the
Introduction. 23°  Further, charitable contributions may be more
beneficial for deterrence and retribution purposes than a fine is for
"victimless" crimes, where the charitable organization becomes a
representative victim to the public. 231' Finally, as with fines and asset
forfeiture,232 a charitable contribution may be an apt sentence in a
financial crime. By looking at the offense and the circumstances
surrounding it, the prosecutor meets his ethical duty to serve the
administration of justice by seeking appropriate methods of
punishment.
2. The Financial Situation of the Defendant
Prosecutors and judges also should consider the defendant's
financial situation to ensure that the prosecutor is using "sound"
discretion233 and not hindering the administration of justice.3 When
possible, the prosecutor should use his discretion to join charitable
contributions with mandatory community service. By combining
these two forms of punishment, the prosecutor enables the defendant
to observe the benefits of his punishment. The concern that a
contribution looks like a "payoff" subsides when the contribution is
an option, not a requirement. 235  Additionally, a contribution may
serve as a "creative" method for punishing corporate defendants that
are otherwise difficult to educate as to the damage done by their
criminal act. 236 The likelihood of inequality among defendants based
on their wealth could be resolved if the payment amount varied
229. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 67, 83 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 67, 83, 93-96 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
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according to the financial situation of the defendant. A prosecutor
can administer justice by using his discretion to allow defendants to
pay on a sliding scale, based on a percentage of their salaries.
Moreover, the inequality could be lessened in cases where it is
possible to use the contributions in conjunction with community
service to reinforce to the defendants the harm caused by the crimes.
For example, if a defendant were pleading guilty to driving while
intoxicated, he could contribute to and participate in community
service with Mothers Against Drunk Driving.237
Despite the potential difficulty of assessing a defendant's financial
situation, a prosecutor who is amenable to alternatives for the
indigent defendant who may not have the option of giving a charitable
contribution will administer justice ethically. For example, the
prosecutor could allow the indigent defendant to spend a larger
amount of time toward the community service component of the
sentence, or even eliminate the contribution entirely, permitting
community service to replace the financial element of the sentence.
Thus, by combining community service and charitable contributions
based on a defendant's income, the prosecutor helps to administer
justice by permitting indigent defendants to have an alternative to a
punishment that they cannot afford.
3. The Degree to Which the Contribution Can Affect the Sentence
Prosecutors should pre-determine the maximum portion of the
overall sentence that a charitable contribution can account for in an
effort to guide their discretion2 38 and to avoid conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.239 It is appropriate for
prosecutors to consider charitable contributions because they enable
defendants to compensate society for their wrongdoing, to
demonstrate remorse, and to benefit society. Setting a ceiling on
contributions is necessary, however, to ensure that punishments do
not vary dramatically from one defendant to the next, that corporate
defendants are not exploited to contribute inordinately more than
individual defendants,240 and that indigent defendants have a similar
opportunity to substitute an alternate punishment that is not
financially related. Moreover, the prosecutor must disclose all aspects
of the plea agreement, including any charitable contribution, to the
237. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 202-03. But see supra note 139 and
accompanying text.
238. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 67, 83, 93-96 and accompanying text.
240. Although corporate defendants should contribute an amount proportionate to
their relative worth to allow for deterrence, prosecutors should not extort corporate
defendants into contributing a disproportionately high amount solely because the
corporate defendants have the financial ability to do so.
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sentencing judge to ensure that the judge is aware of all relevant
factors before determining the final sentence.4
In considering a defendant's financial situation to determine the
correct amount for a charitable contribution, prosecutors allow a
defendant to exhibit contrition by paying an amount that is substantial
for him, even if the amount would be negligible to a wealthy person or
corporation. At the other extreme, if a prosecutor allows a very large
contribution by a wealthy defendant to comprise too great a portion
of the punishment, then the contribution could appear to be an
improper "payoff" to the court. In addition, the amount that a
defendant pays should be the pre-tax amount to avoid the problem of
limiting a citizen's right to receive a tax deduction on the charitable
contribution242 while simultaneously using the contributed amount to
demonstrate remorse. Further, because the charitable contribution is
a separate factor from any fine, there will not be a problem of
diverting funds from the city treasury to a charitable organization.243
Finally, as with a fine, the contribution should not affect victim
restitution. 2' As long as prosecutors keep their discretion in check by
allowing the contribution only to account for part of the punishment,
then this factor will assist prosecutors in not engaging in conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
4. The Appropriateness of the Charities
Finally, a neutral committee should determine which charities are
suitable for charitable contributions to ensure the prosecutor and
judge avoid conflicts of interest. 245  Neither the judge nor the
prosecutor should choose the charity to avoid potential conflicts of
interest or appearances of impropriety between the judge or the
prosecutor and the chosen charitable organization.246
In determining the suitability of a charity, selected organizations
should assist crime victims or the community generally. In cases that
are deemed fitting for charitable contributions as part of sentences,
the victim should be permitted to select the charity from a list of
approved charities. In "victimless" crimes, such as antitrust violations,
the judge should select the charity from a list of approved charities
and provide equal opportunities for charities to be selected. This
procedure assists prosecutors and judges in avoiding conflicts of
interest or the appearance of impropriety by removing them from the
process of selecting the charity to which the defendant may
contribute.
241. See supra notes 89, 199 and accompanying text..
242. See supra notes 184, 186 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 158-60, 184-86 and accompanying text.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 77, 180.
245. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 64, 67, 83, 93-98, 141, 154-56 and accompanying text.
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This proposed system to allow charitable contributions aids the
prosecutor and judge because it allows more options and creativity in
plea bargaining and sentencing while providing guidelines to use
contributions ethically as a punishment. Moreover, the contribution
satisfies many of the goals of the criminal justice system. As with a
fine, there is punitive retribution because the defendant pays for his
wrongdoing, even if a criminal is not incarcerated. Unlike a fine,
charitable contributions expand the population that receives funding.
Further, the defendant may reform in a way that is not possible
through paying a fine into a faceless "city treasury." By paying a debt
to society in a way that improves the lives of victims or community
members, a defendant can see the effect of his crime and
punishment. 47 Additionally, society benefits from the deterrent
aspects of the penalty because the defendant will not want to
compensate society repeatedly for his wrongdoings. 48 Joining the
contribution with community service may more successfully deter the
defendant because he has an opportunity to "do good" by giving a
charitable contribution and putting his money toward a tangible and
positive organization. Although there is less of a stigma associated
with a contribution than with a fine, the public is more likely to hear
of a big contribution because it will attract more publicity than a
fine.249 Therefore, others may be generally deterred, serving the goals
of the criminal justice system.
In the Fagan case,250 the prosecutor may not have met her ethical
duties, according to this proposal. Three of the factors appear to be
appropriate for this plea agreement. First, the situation was suitable
because the witnesses were not willing to testify against the defendant
and the abduction was nonviolent, thus the trial may not have ended
in a conviction.25' Second, the defendant's financial situation
permitted him to give a charitable contribution.252 Third, the victim
chose the charitable organization, which demonstrates an effort to
ensure that there was no connection between the prosecutor or judge
and the charitable organization. However, the degree that the
contribution affected the sentence may have contributed to the
criticism surrounding the plea agreement.253 Here, the prosecutor and
judge may have permitted the contribution to account for too large a
part of the overall sentence by suspending Fagan's sentences before
he served any jail time, while he faced up to twenty years of
247. See supra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
248. The defendant may not be deterred, however, if giving the contribution is not
a hardship or if the person does not mind giving a charitable contribution, which
could be the same problem with a fine.
249. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 2-3, 17 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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incarceration for the two abductions. 4  Parts III.B through III.E
apply this proposed system to hypothetical situations that involve
prosecutorial discretion, judicial sentencing, conflicts of interest, and
unequal justice.
B. Prosecutorial Discretion
1. No Connection to the Charitable Organization
It could be ethical for a prosecutor to enter into a plea agreement
that includes a charitable contribution if the prosecutor is not
connected to the charitable organization. Consider the following:
Prosecutor Pete charges Defendant Dave with committing a
misdemeanor. Pete offers a plea agreement that includes a
condition for Dave to give a $500 charitable contribution to an
organization with which Pete has no connection.
First, the crime that Dave committed did not rise to a level that
required significant jail time, if any, making alternative sentencing a
possibility. If Dave's crime had been a nonviolent felony, it also may
have met the threshold of the proposed system's first factor because
there may not be, for example, a strong need to protect society from
him by keeping him in jail for his entire sentence. As long as the
charges are readily provable and the recommended sentence is
sufficient, then it is possible for Pete to use "sound" prosecutorial
discretion and provide adequate "justice" '255 in this plea agreement.
Second, if Pete knows that Dave's salary permits him to contribute
$500 or if Pete is willing to otherwise replace the condition with an
alternative condition, such as community service, then Pete has met
the second factor in making this agreement ethical.
Third, the large discretionary power afforded to Pete allows him to
determine whether a charitable contribution is in the interest of
justice and whether the justice system can best be served by including
the charitable contribution as part of the plea agreement. As an
advocate and a government employee,256 a prosecutor is expected to
consider the overall benefit for all citizens, 257 but he also must
consider the narrow purpose of redressing the wrong created by a
criminal act. Proponents of this condition say that a defendant could
be better rehabilitated by contributing to a charity than by traditional
sentences25s or that the contribution could better serve the community
than a fine.25 9 In addition, as in the Fagan case,260 defendants who
254. See supra notes 8, 12 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 60, 78 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 64, 93-96 and accompanying text.
257. Uviller, supra note 64, at 1697.
258. See supra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 158 (discussing United States v. Haile, 795 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.
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have admitted their guilt likely may not be convicted through a trial
because a witness or victim does not wish to testify against them.26'
Opponents suggest that the punishment may not be effective if the
goals of the criminal justice system are not met in the same way as a
fine.262 This may happen if the defendant or others in the community
do not perceive the contribution to be a punishment.263
Fourth, the appropriateness of the charity depends on how it was
chosen. When a prosecutor enters into a plea agreement that includes
a charitable contribution for a charity to which he has no connection,
he does not violate any explicit ethical rule.2 64 As long as a neutral
party selected the charitable organization, this final factor also is met.
Because this practice does not violate an ethical rule and this unique
type of plea agreement may sometimes be the best way to ensure that
justice is served and the defendant pays for his crime, it is ethical for
the prosecutor to enter into plea agreements that include charitable
contributions.
2. Dismissing Charges
It may be appropriate in certain situations for a prosecutor to
dismiss criminal charges when a defendant gives a contribution.
Consider the following:
Prosecutor Pete charges Defendant Dave with committing a
misdemeanor, which is Dave's first offense. Pete offers to dismiss
the criminal charges altogether if Dave gives a $500 contribution to
an organization with which Pete has no connection.
Three of the proposed system's factors-the situation surrounding
the offense, the defendant's financial situation, and the
appropriateness of the charity-are considered in the first
hypothetical.265 In this hypothetical, however, the concern is the
degree to which the contribution can affect the sentence. Pete is
permitted to use his discretion to determine whether to abandon a
prosecution. Prosecutors may dispose of cases when they believe
1986)). Although the Fifth Circuit reversed the charitable contributions portion of
the sentence in Haile, the court noted:
It might be true that the rehabilitation of a person such as [the defendant]
will be fostered by charitable gifts or by the response from the community
that they provoke. It might also be true that judicially approved charitable
organizations can spend money, and thereby benefit the community, more
intelligently than can the U.S. government.
795 F.2d at 492.
260. See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Fagan's response evidences that his
punishment would not deter him.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 201-02.
265. See supra Part III.B.1.
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incarceration or fines would not properly punish defendants when, for
example, the defendant is a first-time offender or the offense is
nonviolent.26 With criminal behavior that is difficult to prove at trial,
and with a defendant who is not willing to admit guilt as part of a plea
bargain, 267 a prosecutor may be encouraged to abandon the
prosecution if the defendant is willing to give a charitable
contribution. If there were an interest in keeping the defendant off of
the streets,268 however, the prosecutor does not seek justice
appropriately by disposing of the case without pursuing jail time.269
Moreover, if a prosecutor requests a charitable contribution as part of
his determination to abandon a prosecution, the charitable
contribution could appear to be the reason for the decision, which
could be viewed as a payoff that does not serve the interests of
justice.270
Further, transparency is a concern. Where prosecutors use their
discretion to not charge the defendant with any crime when there is
evidence that a criminal act may have occurred, the public may not
know of the wrongdoing. Then, the defendant-or others-may
commit similar crimes because the prosecutor has not attempted to
deter the criminal behavior by bringing charges for the initial criminal
act. On the other hand, publicity generated from a large charitable
contribution associated with wrongdoing that may not have reached
the level of criminal behavior could have an even greater deterrent
effect than other punishments. Although decisions not to prosecute
may be appropriate in certain situations, in this hypothetical, Pete's
decision not to prosecute based on Dave's charitable contributions
would be unethical if the contribution were the sole factor leading to
that determination. If Pete has allowed the contribution to account
for the entire sentence, the third factor of the proposed system is not
satisfied.
C. Judicial Sentencing
Contributions ethically may replace part of a fine or jail term for a
sentence. Consider the following:
Prosecutor Pete charges Defendant Dave with committing a
misdemeanor. Judge James sentences Dave to give a $500
266. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
268. Some courts have permitted charitable contributions to be used in some cases
of violent crimes. See supra note 115. Others have not upheld charitable
contributions in these types of cases, although the reasoning was not specifically
because the crime was violent. See supra notes 197-99.
269. See supra notes 60, 78 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 67, 83, 93-96 and accompanying text; see also Colquitt, supra
note 41, at 716-17.
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charitable contribution to an organization with which James has no
connection, as part of probation that decreases the fine or jail term.
Three of the proposed system's factors-the situation surrounding
the offense, the defendant's financial situation, and the
appropriateness of the charity-are similar to those of the first
hypothetical.271  As in the second hypothetical, this situation
contemplates the degree to which the contribution can affect the
sentence. Judges ultimately determine whether alternative sentencing
would better suit a particular defendant or crime. Courts traditionally
condone punishments that are similar to charitable contributions
when they sentence defendants to perform community service.
Although community service involves giving time instead of money,
both punishments have similar goals of rehabilitation, deterrence, and
benefiting the public overall. Many people contribute to charitable
organizations because they want to, not as a punishment. If a
defendant does not perceive a charitable contribution as a
punishment, then justice has not been served because the defendant
has not been punished for the crime. Community service also can be
viewed as a way for a prosecutor or judge to assist a charitable
organization that he is interested in, even though there is less of a
concern of a payoff because money is not involved. Still, the judicial
canon that prohibits conflicts is not solely concerned with monetary
"interest. 2 72 Because community service is not viewed as a conflicting
interest, charitable contributions similarly should not be.
Charitable contributions are comparable to fines and asset
forfeiture as well.2 73 With fines and asset forfeiture, the funds go to
the city instead of a charity, but the government deters the defendant
through any of these channels by forcing the defendant to pay for the
crime committed. Defendants who are compelled to give money
through all three methods may feel more deprived than if they were
incarcerated,274 particularly if part of the motive for committing the
crime is financial. All three methods also provide a way for courts to
deter criminal conduct by forcing a defendant to pay for his misdeeds.
With fines and asset forfeiture, the funds often are used to investigate
and prosecute crime. Charitable contributions, however, can be used
to reduce crime by ameliorating underlying social problems that lead
to crime. Thus, using charitable contributions in lieu of part of a jail
term or fine is ethical.
271. See supra Part III.B.1.
272. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
274. See Dressier, supra note 18, § 1.01, at 2.
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D. Conflicts of Interest
1. Connection to the Charitable Organization
If the prosecutor or judge were connected to the charitable
organization to which a defendant gave a contribution, the
contribution would be an unethical part of the sentence. Consider the
following:
Prosecutor Pete charges Defendant Dave with committing a
misdemeanor. Pete offers a plea agreement that includes a
condition for Dave to give a $500 charitable contribution to a
specific organization. Pete's wife is on the organization's board.
Alternatively, Pete's wife is not on the board, but Judge James, the
sentencing judge, is a member of the board.
Three of the proposed system's factors-the situation surrounding
the offense, the defendant's financial situation, and the degree to
which the contribution can affect the sentence -are similar to those of
the first two hypotheticals.275  This hypothetical concerns the
appropriateness of the charities. While there are benefits to including
charitable contributions as part of plea agreements, both the
prosecutor and the judge can violate the ethical duty to avoid conflicts
of interest if either has a connection to the charity.276 If the prosecutor
sits on the board of a charitable organization or is related to a person
who works with the organization, his personal interest in the
charitable contribution may limit his ability to handle the defendant in
an "even-handed" way.277 A prosecutor is given great discretion and
power in his public position. 27 He cannot use his power to promote
private interests,279 however, which may be of particular concern if the
prosecutor chooses which charities receive the defendant's
contributions. As for the alternative situation with Judge James, any
connections that are unethical for prosecutors to have with the
charitable organizations are similarly unethical for judges because
judges are held to even higher standards than prosecutors.2 s0
The Model Rules and Model Code allow conflicts of interest under
certain conditions for prosecutors;281 thus, it similarly may be possible
to allow the prosecutor to have a conflict with a "personal interest" in
275. See supra Part III.B.
276. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing the need for prosecutors
to avoid special interests in People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 314-15 (Cal. 1996)
(internal quotations omitted)) The Eubanks court noted that prosecutorial discretion
must be exercised "with the highest degree of integrity and impartiality, and with the
appearance thereof." 927 P.2d at 314-15 (citation omitted).
278. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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a charity.282 Other problems arise in this context, however, in which
prudence would prohibit these arrangements altogether. A criminal
prosecutor is in a different position than an attorney who wants to
represent two clients with similar interests because a criminal
defendant may not feel comfortable rejecting a plea offer, knowing
that the prosecutor controls his liberty. Hence, the full disclosure of a
prosecutor's tie to a charity283 unintentionally may encourage the
defendant who knows of the prosecutor's connection to "payoff" the
prosecutor by contributing to an organization with which the
prosecutor is affiliated.
When a prosecutor seeks to seize funds through asset forfeiture and
fines, however, he also has an interest in attaining a conviction or
guilty plea. Although one bar committee noted that this does not
create an unfair incentive for prosecutors to enforce these laws,2 4 the
discretion to seek these funds can give prosecutors more of an interest
than if the money were to go to a charity to which he had no
connection. Consequently, asset forfeiture and fines may encourage
prosecutors to zealously enforce certain laws in a way that is unfair to
defendants who commit crimes that are profitable for the city. Yet,
the judicial system gives prosecutors considerable discretion because
they are expected to maintain a high standard of ethical responsibility
in seeking justice." 5 Nevertheless, the personal aspect of Pete's
potential interest in a charitable organization to which he has a
connection, and to which Dave would contribute through a plea
agreement, would create an unethical conflict of interest.2 6
2. Charitable Contributions Prior to Arrest
If a defendant gave a donation prior to his arrest, it would be
unethical for a prosecutor to consider the contribution as part of the
defendant's sentence. Consider the following:
Defendant Dave gave a $500 donation to the police. Two months
later, Prosecutor Pete charges Dave with committing a
misdemeanor, which is Dave's first offense. Pete offers to dismiss
the criminal charge altogether because of Dave's past generosity.
Three of the proposed system's factors-the situation surrounding
the offense, the defendant's financial situation, and the
appropriateness of the charity-are considered in the first
hypothetical.287 In this hypothetical, the concern is the degree to
282. For example, a conflict may be permitted if it is fully disclosed to the
defendant and the defendant agrees in writing to permit the conflict.
283. In addition to disclosing the relationship with the charity to the defendant, a
prosecutor also must apprise the court of the connection. See supra notes 88-89.
284. See supra notes 207-08.
285. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
287. See supra Part III.B.1.
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which a donation can affect a sentence. Because a prosecutor cannot
hide the reasons for dismissing charges,288 this connection creates the
appearance that a person can buy his way out of criminal charges. A
defendant who regularly donates to a charitable organization may
equate this act to a contribution that is given as part of a plea
agreement or sentence because the "punishment" has been the same.
Yet, a person cannot serve a punishment before a criminal act has
occurred. In addition, donations given beforehand may not
demonstrate a defendant's contrition or remorse because the
contribution may have been given for a different purpose, such as to
receive a tax deduction, and it may not have deterred the person from
criminal behavior. If the defendant donated to an investigating
agency, like an organization that supports the police,289 the donation
may appear to be a "payoff." Thus, a prosecutor who dismisses
charges because a defendant regularly donates to a charitable
organization would appear to allow the donation to affect the entirety
of the sentence, giving the appearance of accepting a bribe.
There is an institutional interest in wanting the public to have
confidence that courts are neutral and fair. Even the appearance that
the prosecutor has used his position to influence the defendant into
giving a contribution could be an inappropriate use of discretion
because of the long-term damage that may result from the public's
perception that justice can be bought.2 19 This problem is magnified for
defendants who cannot afford to donate continually, creating an
inequality between wealthy and indigent citizens. 291 Additionally,
wealthier citizens may not be deterred from criminal activity when
they observe prosecutors not punishing defendants as a result of
donations that they had given. Therefore, Pete should not consider
the donation that Dave gave prior to his arrest.
3. Defendant Offers to Give Contribution
There is no difference if the defendant or the prosecutor initiated
the discussion of including a charitable contribution in the plea
agreement. Consider the following:
Prosecutor Pete charges Defendant Dave with committing a
misdemeanor. Dave offers a plea agreement that includes a
condition for him to give a $500 charitable contribution to an
organization with which Pete has no connection.
288. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 98.
290. See supra notes 93-98, 141-57 and accompanying text; see also Cowles v.
Brownell, 538 N.E.2d 325, 327 (N.Y. 1989) (noting that behavior that creates these
types of concealed arrangements "does not foster public confidence that the justice
system operates evenhandedly").
291. See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 122, at 37.
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Three of the proposed system's factors-the situation surrounding
the offense, the defendant's financial situation, and the
appropriateness of the charity--are considered in the first
hypothetical.292 In this hypothetical, the concern, again, is the degree
to which the contribution can affect the sentence. When a prosecutor
offers the agreement, there is no ethical dilemma.293 A problem may
arise when the defendant offers the agreement, however, because it
may appear as if the defendant were seeking to buy his way out of
punishment for the crime. Nonetheless, a defendant who initiates an
offer to include a charitable contribution in a plea agreement is still
admitting his guilt, which aids in deterrence and rehabilitation.
Although a wealthy defendant would be in a better position than an
indigent defendant to propose a charitable contribution, the same
inequality exists when a prosecutor offers to include any financial
condition in a plea agreement. The Supreme Court has permitted this
inequality because poverty is not considered a "suspect" class 294 and
the right to a plea agreement is not a fundamental right;29 therefore,
this inequality need only have a rational relationship to avoid
violating the Equal Protection Clause.296  Here, the rational
relationship is that the agreements may better reform and deter
criminals. Therefore, there is no difference in the ethical
consequences if the defendant or the prosecutor initially offered to
include a charitable contribution as part of the plea bargain.
E. Unequal Justice
1. Defendant Cannot Afford Contribution
If a defendant cannot afford to give the contribution, he would not
have the option of giving a charitable contribution as part of his
sentence. Consider the following:
Prosecutor Pete charges Defendant Dave with committing a
misdemeanor. Pete offers a plea agreement that includes a
condition for Dave to give a $500 charitable contribution to an
organization with which Pete has no connection. Dave is indigent
and cannot afford the $500 contribution.
Three of the proposed system's factors-the situation surrounding
the offense, the degree to which the contribution can affect the
sentence, and the appropriateness of the charity-are considered in
292. See supra Part III.B.1.
293. See supra Part 1II.B.1.
294. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); see infra Part ILI.E for the disparity
between the wealthy and indigent.
295. See Colquitt, supra note 41, at 700.
296. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638.
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the first six hypotheticals.297 In this hypothetical, the concern is the
defendant's financial situation. While a defendant may benefit by,
and agree to, this type of arrangement if he can afford to pay the
contribution,298 these types of plea agreements can create the
appearance of unequal justice if one defendant can afford to
contribute but another cannot. The prosecutor has a responsibility as
a minister of justice to treat defendants equally.299 Yet prosecutors
are not held to the same "disinterested" standard as judges.3 0 For
example, prosecutors are permitted to have a financial incentive from
fines collected through a prosecution that judges are prohibited from
having.30 1 Moreover, convictions generally are not set aside with
''even a clear appearance of impropriety in the participation of the
prosecutor."3 2  Further, in seeking justice, the adversarial system
requires a prosecutor to be a zealous advocate, unlike a judge.30 3 As a
result, prosecutors' discretion and advocacy roles allow them to
enforce justice with a degree of inequality if they perceive it to be
necessary. Judges, on the other hand, must be impartial and
neutral. 3 4 Therefore, it could be unethical for them to acquiesce to
plea agreements that are not options for all defendants.
Justice also may be unequal if the only way to specifically deter the
wealthy person is to compel him to pay an extraordinary amount in
contributions; thus, he potentially pays more than an indigent
defendant for committing a similar crime. Consequently, the
wealthier defendant is paying more in the form of a contribution than
a fine, simply to avoid the stigma of a criminal fine. The wealthy
defendant at least has the option of incarceration or paying a fine in
lieu of giving the charitable contribution.
A defendant who is state dependent, however, should not use the
funds he receives from the state to contribute to a charity because he
needs those resources to survive. In addition, this use of state funds
may have the unintended effect of encouraging that defendant to
commit another crime to gain resources to survive. Thus, the
defendant who cannot afford to contribute may not have this option,
and his financial situation may necessitate that he be punished
297. See supra Parts III.B-D.
298. See Eaton, supra note 122, at 37; see also supra notes 221-22.
299. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 93-99, 102-06 and accompanying text; see also Young v. United
States, 481 U.S. 787, 807 (1987).
301. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
302. Dick v. Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192, 196 (6th Cir. 1989). But see id. at 199
(Celebrezze, J., concurring) (noting that an appearance of impropriety could infect a
proceeding if a prosecutor has a financial interest at stake).
303. Dick, 882 F.2d at 197 (citing Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248); see
also People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 316 (Cal. 1996) ("True disinterest on the issue
of such a defendant's guilt is the domain of the judge and the jury-not the
prosecutor.").
304. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
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differently than a defendant who can afford to contribute."" The
outcome may be unequal, but the law already embodies such
inequalities." 6 Indigent defendants cannot serve jail terms longer
than a statutory maximum if they cannot pay a fine, yet they may face
longer terms than a defendant who can pay a fine.3 7 Although certain
defendants may not want to serve jail time in lieu of paying a
contribution, other defendants may prefer not having the financial
commitment.30 8 Still, the judicial system allows indigent defendants
other options to ensure that they are not denied constitutional
rights.30 9 Hence, an indigent defendant would not have an option of
giving a charitable contribution as part of a plea agreement, adding
another layer of inequality that already exists in the law.
2. Contribution to the Victim
The prosecutor could allow the victim to receive restitution from
the defendant, but he should not require another contribution to the
victim to be part of the plea agreement. Consider the following:
Prosecutor Pete charges Defendant Dave with harassing Victim
Vincent. Pete offers a plea agreement that includes a condition for
Dave to give a $500 charitable contribution to Vincent.
Three of the proposed system's factors-the situation surrounding
the offense, the defendant's financial situation, and the degree to
which the contribution can affect the sentence-are similar to those in
the first two hypotheticals 1  This hypothetical concerns the
appropriateness of the charities. Contributions to organizations that
aid victims of crimes can serve the goals of the criminal justice system
by ensuring that defendants "pay" for their crimes and are deterred.
The additional publicity associated with a contribution rather than a
fine may further increase the likelihood of deterring misconduct.3
While charitable contributions are not intended to be punitive, the
charitable organization benefits regardless of the motivation behind
the contribution. Yet, if the defendant or the public does not view the
305. There is no justice when it "can be bought by the highest bidder." Fla. Bar v.
Machin, 635 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. 1994) (affirming a 90-day suspension of the
defendant-attorney's law practice because an attorney should not try to buy a victim's
silence at sentencing because that is prejudicial to the administration of justice and it
would be unfair if a wealthy defendant could opt for a lesser sentence than a
defendant who could not pay for silence).
306. See supra notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
307. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243,244 (1970).
308. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
309. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (overturning a statute that did
not permit indigent defendants a free transcript of their trial for appellate review
because the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating as to who
could appeal convictions based on an ability to pay).
310. See supra Part III.B.
311. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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contribution as a punishment, the charitable contributions will not
deter criminal activity.
It would not serve the administration of justice to allow the victim
to benefit from the defendant's crime in lieu of a sentence that the
defendant must pay to society. Victim restitution is different than
charitable contributions,3 12 but charities can substitute for the
unknown victim or when the crime is "victimless." '313 If the public at
large is harmed, then a charity can stand in the place as a victim and
benefit from the contribution in a way that serves similar purposes as
victim restitution would. The designated charity could have a direct
connection to the crime, such as a contribution to Mothers Against
Drunk Driving by defendants charged with driving while intoxicated,
permitting the symbolic representation of the victim to be an
appropriate beneficiary. Vincent, as the victim, however, could not
serve that purpose; a charitable contribution to him would be
unethical.
CONCLUSION
With the need to develop creative solutions to sentencing problems
and the trend toward the neediest individuals continually losing the
fight for government funding, allowing defendants to give charitable
contributions in lieu of a fine can benefit society and rehabilitate
defendants in a way that incarceration or a fine cannot. By combining
charitable contributions with community service, the prosecutor
encourages an overall goal of promoting social welfare and assisting to
rehabilitate the defendant who is able to see the effect of his
contribution and service. When a person gives to a charity-even by
contract-he is doing a good deed, which may improve his character.
The defendant should not receive a "deal" or "bargain" by agreeing to
contribute to a charity, but he benefits by choosing to whom he pays
his "debt" for his criminal activity. To ensure that prosecutors follow
the rules of ethics and that the judicial system maintains its integrity
when applying these sentences, prosecutors should follow the
guidelines set forth in this Note's proposal3 14 when incorporating
charitable contributions into plea agreements and sentences: (1) the
situation surrounding the offense, (2) the financial situation of the
defendant, (3) the degree to which the contribution can affect the
sentence, and (4) the appropriateness of the charities. Prosecutors
and judges can expand their methods of reforming criminal
defendants and meeting the goals of criminal justice by including
312. In cases with a clear victim, the charitable contribution would be added on top
of victim restitution. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 551 N.E.2d 1164, 1169 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990).
313. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
314. See supra Part III.A.
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charitable contributions in appropriate plea agreements and
sentences.
